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Chinese firms are experiencing a rapid increase in technological diversification, which 
is referred to as maintaining their capabilities in multiple technologies. However, the 
research on the relationship between technological diversification and firm 
performance is inconclusive. This PhD thesis tries to re-investigate the technological 
diversification-firm performance relationship from three different perspectives using 
data on Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2014. First, the thesis tries to overcome the 
shortcomings of previous technological diversification research by unpacking 
technological diversification into explorative and exploitative technological 
dimensions from the mechanical view and studying their roles in firm performance. 
The findings suggest that technological diversification that combines explorative and 
exploitative dimensions is positively related to firm performance. This relationship is 
conditional on intangible complementary assets and firm type (high or low-tech 
firms). Second, this thesis tries to investigate the technological diversification-firm 
performance relationship through an institutional view that has hardly been mentioned 
in the previous literature. Here it is argued that firms try to use technological 
diversification as a way to gain legitimacy. In order to do so, firms’ technological 
diversification need to be similar to the industrial norms. The results reveal a positive 
relationship between firms’ conformity in technological diversification and their 
performance. The results further delineate the boundary conditions that influence 
this relationship. While environmental dynamism strengthens the conformity-
performance relationship, environmental munificence reduces it. Finally, this thesis 
tries to integrate both a mechanical view and an institutional view of technological 
diversification and find evidence to support the optimal distinctiveness view that firms 
should reach a balance between these views. The results reveal a curvilinear (inverted 
U-shaped) relationship between firms' conformity in technological diversification 
and their performance. I also test the boundary conditions of this relationship. While 
firm age strengthens the conformity-performance relationship, state ownership 
weakens it.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
Since the initiation of the ‘open door policy’ in 1978, China, as the largest emerging 
economy and second largest economy behind the USA, has experienced a significant 
economic boost. These advances in the economy have also changed the technological 
landscape in terms of diversification. Technological diversification which related to the 
degree that organisations obtain capabilities in multiple technologies, has attracted 
much both scholars’ and practitioners’ attention (Cantwell & Vertova, 2004). The 
degree of technological diversification in China has increased dramatically since 1986 
and the diversification of different regions has also increased and converged (Wang, 
Ning, & Prevezer, 2015). This indicates from a macro perspective that regions are 
becoming more and more diversified in multiple technologies. However, this trend may 
also reflect the increase in the technological diversification of firms in China. 
 
Technological diversification at the firm level is different from that at the regional level. 
The main difference related to the different capabilities that firms and regions own. At 
the firm level, the capabilities to conduct technological diversification are limited. 
Firms are constrained by limited capabilities such as financial resources, human capital 
among others. This makes the diversification capabilities more rare and valuable among 
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firms. On the contrary, the regions have relatively abundant capabilities to conduct 
diversification strategies. As a result, typical organisational theories such as resource-
based view (RBV) and institutional view are a better fit to analyse firms’ diversification 
strategies instead of regional diversification.  
 
From a more macro perspective, according to a survey of 100 large state-owned firms 
and 30 large non-state-owned firms by the Ministry of Commerce of China, the number 
of firms that diversified increased from 97 in 2011 to 126 in 2015, and the share of 
diversified firms increased to 96.92% in 2015, from 74.62% in 20111. Moreover, since 
the issue of the National Outline for Medium and Long-term Planning for Scientific 
and Technological Development (2006-2020) in 2006, central and local governments 
in China have initiated a bundle of policies to encourage domestic firms to acquire and 
absorb foreign technologies, which will further increase the propensity for 
technological diversification in China. However, the research findings on the 
relationship between technological diversification and firm performance are mixed. As 
a result, the inconsistent findings, on the one hand, prevent technological diversification 
research expanding boundaries. On the other hand, increasing firms in China are 
expanding their technology portfolios without knowing the financial consequences. 
These firms may not get the profits from multiple technologies that they expected. In 
                                                   
1 http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2016-09/01/content_1724013.htm 
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conclusion, it is essential to detangle the relationship between technological 
diversification and firm performance.   
 
Research on technological diversification and firm performance has attracted much 
attention. Previous studies have proposed three models to illustrate the relationship 
between technological diversification and firm performance, i.e. the premium 
diversification model, the discount diversification model, and the U-inverted model, 
which show positive, negative, and curvilinear effects of technological diversification 
respectively (Benito‐Osorio, Guerras‐Martín, & Zuñiga‐Vicente, 2012). For example, 
after analysing the Taiwanese smartphone sector, Chen, Yang, and Lin (2013) found 
that technological diversification played a negative role in firm performance. Raghuram, 
Henri, and Luigi (2000); Rumelt (1982) and Vojislav and Gordon (2002) all found 
negative financial implications of diversification. Chiu, Lai, Lee, and Liaw (2008) also 
studied Taiwanese firms and found a positive relationship between technological 
diversification and firm performance. Chiu et al. (2008); Garcia-Vega (2006); Kim, Lee, 
and Cho (2016); Miller (2006); Zander (1997) and Lin and Chang (2015) all found 
similar positive financial implications of technological diversification. Du, Lu, and Guo 
(2015) found an inverse U-shaped relationship from 134 Chinese machinery and 
equipment manufacturing firms. Similarly, Leten, Belderbos, and Van Looy (2007); 
Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) and Manuel and Simi (2002) all indicated the non-linear 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
12 
relationship between diversification and firm performance. This U-inverted model is 
the combination of the premium and discount model which not only stress the benefits 
of diversification but also the cost of multiple portfolios. As a result, this model believes 
the relationship between technological diversification and firm performance is not 
straightforward. In conclusion, the research results are rather mixed in terms of the 
relationship between technological diversification and firm performance. 
 
Although there is practical evidence that more and more firms in China are becoming 
technological diversifiers, scholars of technological diversification have not reached a 
consensus regarding its role in firm performance. Both the benefits and costs of 
technological diversification have been discussed in previous literature. These 
ambiguities not only theoretically limit the applications of technological diversification 
logic in predicting improvements in performance but also practically limit the provision 
of guidelines for firms in regard to implementing diversification strategies to enhance 
their technological capabilities. 
 
The inconsistencies in the findings of this studies stem from three main issues. First, 
the measures of diversification that used before are incomplete. The current 
operationalisations effectively take a mechanical view of technological diversification 
that regards it as firms’ rational pursuit of profit. This stream of literature often measures 
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technological diversification based on ‘the breadth of a body of knowledge’, but ignores 
‘how far a firm pursues links in the knowledge network’ (Miller, 2006). Also, traditional 
measures of technological diversification are sensitive to firms’ portfolio composition, 
which can create ambiguities (Robins & Wiersema, 2003). Thus, a more comprehensive 
measure of technological diversification should be incorporated to fully capture both 
‘how far’ and ‘how deep’ firms pursue knowledge in regard to linking multiple 
technologies. 
 
Second, the conclusions of previous research have been drawn based on the logic of 
consequentiality, that is, technological diversification is considered ‘atomic behaviour’ 
and ‘instrumental actions’ to influence output. Previous studies have characterised 
technological diversification as a rational decision or strategy that can bring synergy to 
existing technology portfolios or act as a resource to build competitive advantage 
(Corradini, Demirel, & Battisti, 2016; Kim et al., 2016). This logic of consequentiality, 
however, fails to provide sufficient evidence to explain why, in some circumstances, 
technological diversification benefits firm performance, while in others it does not. That 
is to say, this perspective does not “recognise the potential influence of market actors … 
about the sources or criteria of organisational efficiency” (Zajac and Westphal, 2004: 
434). Firms are embedded in an institutional environment and socially situated context 
(Westphal & Zajac, 2013). The interpretation of firms’ strategies, such as technological 
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diversification, is socially constructed and constituted. Thus, firms’ strategies, such as 
technological diversification, should also be considered in the larger context, as an 
institutional strategy, rather than simply as an individual organisation’s rational activity. 
However, research that considers technological diversification from an institutional 
perspective in terms of its role in firm performance is limited. Most of the research, 
based on a mechanical view, is under-socialised. 
 
Thirdly, some recent advances suggest that focusing on either institutional perspectives 
or mechanical views of technological diversification is problematic in regard to 
improving firm performance (Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, & Miller, 2017; Zuckerman, 
2016). Thus, if the mechanical view and institutional view of technological 
diversification both hold, focusing on either side of technological diversification may 
also result in ambiguity regarding the financial implications. In this regard, the 
integration of the two perspectives of technological diversification not only reflects the 
recent theoretical advances in optimal distinctiveness, that is, that firms should reach a 
balance between a mechanical view to differentiate and an institutional view to conform, 
but can also provide new evidence regarding the technological diversification-firm 
performance relationship. 
1.2 Statement of purposes 
In this Ph.D. thesis, I try to solve the aforementioned three problems above that may 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
15 
result in inconsistency in the technological diversification-firm performance 
relationship based on data from Chinese listed firms. Specifically, I first argue that 
technological diversification is not a monolithic construct. Miller (2006) proposes that 
technological diversification refers to the diversity of a firm’s research portfolio and 
the depth to which a firm pursues links in its knowledge network (Miller, 2006: 606). 
This definition incorporates two dimensions of technological diversification that are 
largely ignored in the literature. I argue that the perspective of technological 
diversification relating to exploration has been extensively discussed, while the other 
perspective, relating to exploitation, has drawn little attention in previous technological 
diversification literature. I unpack technological diversification into two perspectives, 
i.e. explorative technological diversification and exploitative technological 
diversification. Moreover, I also provide an operationalisation of both aspects of 
technological diversification and study how a more comprehensive view of 
technological diversification may affect firm performance. This chapter is based on a 
mechanical view of technological diversification, like most of the previous research. 
However, it contributes to the literature by unpacking and operationalising explorative 
and exploitative technological diversification respectively. 
 
Next, I try to provide new information regarding the technological diversification-firm 
performance relationship from an institutional perspective. To be specific, I try to 
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understand the technological diversification in the larger institutional context in which 
firms are embedded. That is, firms’ technological diversification patterns should be 
similar to those of their competitors in order to conform to the industry recipe and 
further gain organisational legitimacy. I explain the roles of technological 
diversification in firm performance through this isomorphism, which confers 
legitimacy and resources on companies (Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995). This logic 
of appropriateness from an institutional view is significantly different from the logic of 
consequentiality (rational perspective) that has been used in past technological 
diversification research (also in the last chapter). This view argues that firms’ strategic 
positioning and decisions may not be entirely rational and may just be a response to 
institutional pressure. The institutional theory may serve as an antidote to the over-
rationalist and technocratic perspective (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin-Andersson, & 
Suddaby, 2008). In this way, explaining the technological diversification-firm 
performance relationship from a different angle may provide a complementary 
explanation beyond the mechanical view. 
 
Third, this thesis tries to reflect on recent theoretical advances in optimal distinctiveness 
and combine both perspectives mentioned above (i.e. the mechanical and institutional 
perspectives) regarding technological diversification. Specifically, I aim to integrate 
both aspects of technological diversification and build a framework that explains how 
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a trade-off between the mechanical view and the institutional view can contribute to 
firm performance. I also investigate how this trade-off may change in terms of firm 
characteristics. I believe that in this way this chapter will contribute to the technological 
diversification literature by theoretically integrating both aspects and empirically 
testing the contingencies of the trade-off. 
 
Finally, in the last section, I will discuss the main findings in the previous chapters. I 
will propose a framework that synthesises the mechanical and institutional views of 
technological diversification and the key contingencies of each view of technological 
diversification. I will also try to indicate some key mechanisms that may change the 
technological diversification-firm performance relationship that this PhD thesis does 
not address. Specifically, encouraged by recent advances regarding the mediation effect 
between firms’ resources and firm performance (Li-Ying, Wang, & Ning, 2016), I argue 
that more research can be done to add to the technological diversification literature 
through investigating more conditions that mediate the technological diversification-
firm performance relationship. Future research could be enlightened and encouraged 
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1.3 Research questions and hypothesis 
This Ph.D. thesis firstly reviews the literature on technological diversification, 
regarding the mechanical perspective, the institutional perspective and the optimal 
distinctiveness view related to the trade-off between differentiation and conformity in 
terms of technological diversification. The next three chapters empirically test the 
technological diversification-firm performance relationship through three different but 
complementary aspects. The core question that I try to answer in this PhD thesis is: 
Does firms’ technological diversification relate to firm performance? Chapter 3 
answers this question from a mechanical view combining explorative and exploitative 
technological diversification. I also investigate two boundary conditions of this 
relationship. I propose three hypotheses in this chapter: 
 
H3.1: Technological diversification that considers both the explorative and exploitative 
perspectives has a positive effect on firms’ performance. 
 
H3.2: Technological diversification is more effective in promoting firms’ performance 
in low-tech firms than in high-tech firms. 
 
H3.3: Complementary assets positively moderate the relationship between 
technological diversification and firm performance. 
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Chapter 4 aims to investigate the technological diversification-firm performance 
relationship from the angle of institutions. I explain that technological diversification 
can lead to superior firm performance through conforming to the ‘industry recipe’ 
(Spender, 1989). I also investigate two contingencies that may change this relationship. 
I propose three hypotheses in this chapter: 
 
H4.1: Firms’conformity to their industry norms in terms of technological 
diversification is positively associated with firm performance. 
 
H4.2: The higher the environmental dynamism, the stronger the relationship between 
firms’ conformity in technological diversification and performance. 
 
H4.3: The higher the environmental munificence, the weaker the relationship between 
firms’ conformity in technological diversification and performance. 
 
Chapter 5 integrates the two perspectives and investigates how optimal technological 
diversification conformity enhances firm performance. I argue that there is a trade-off 
between the mechanical view and institutional view of technological diversification. 
Therefore, optimal technological diversification conformity relates to firm performance. 
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I will adopt two complementary ways to test this argument. First, I construct a 
measurement by multiplying the construct of technological diversification from both 
mechanic view and institutional view. If the coefficient of this interaction is negative 
and significant, the replacement effect between differentiation and conformity in regard 
to technological diversification will be concluded. Second, I aim to investigate the non-
linear relationship of technological diversification conformity. If the inverse U-shaped 
relationship is observed, then I can confirm that there is a trade-off between 
differentiation and conformity in terms of technological diversification. I will also 
explore two boundary conditions under this circumstance. I propose three hypotheses 
in this chapter: 
 
H5.1: There is an optimal level of technological diversification conformity that relates 
to firm performance. That is to say, there is a trade-off between technological 
diversification as a differentiation activity and conformity. 
 
H5.2: State ownership negatively moderates the relationship between technological 
diversification conformity and firm performance. 
 
H5.3: Firm age positively moderates the relationship between technological 
diversification conformity and firm performance. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
21 
1.4 PhD Thesis Outline 
This PhD thesis addresses the technological diversification-firm performance 
relationship through three different and complementary angles. Figure 1-1 illustrates 




Chapter 1 : Introduction
Central question that need to be solved: How and 
whether technological diversification leads to firm 
performance
Chapter 2 : Literature Review
Three stream of literature to be reviewed
• Mechanical view of technological diversification (RBV, 
TCE, RDT) 
• Institutional view of technological diversification
• Optimal distinctiveness view of technological 
diversification
Chapter 3 : Empirical chapter from mechanical view
Central question that needs to be solved: How 
technological diversification that combines exploration 
and exploitation contributes to firm performance
Chapter 4 : Empirical chapter from institutional view
Central question that needs to be solved: How 
technological diversification conformity to industry 
receipt contributes to firm performance
Chapter 5 : Empirical chapter combining mechanical and 
institutional view
Central question that needs to be solved: Whether  
technological diversification that combines 
aforementioned views contributes to firm performance
Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion
Theoretical framework that integrates different 
perspectives of technological diversification and indicates 
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Figure 1- 1 Overall research framework of the PhD thesis 
 
After this section, I will review the literature that explains why firms engage multiple 
technologies. Specifically, I will explain technological diversification from a 
mechanical view, which incorporates RBV, TCE and RDT. Then, I will try to 
understand technological diversification as a way to legitimate firms’ behaviour from 
an institutional view. Lastly, I will try to combine the two perspectives of technological 
diversification and explain technological diversification in the light of the recent 
theoretical advances regarding optimal distinctiveness, whereby it is believed that there 
is a trade-off between the mechanical view and institutional view of technological 
diversification. The propose of this chapter is to build a theoretical framework that can 
provide a foundation for the following empirical tests. 
 
Chapter 3 empirically investigates the technological diversification-firm performance 
relationship from a mechanical view. According to this view, firms perform better if 
they have a higher degree of technological diversification. However, the previous 
literature based on a mechanical view of technological diversification mostly considers 
the exploration of multiple technologies. This biased view ignores the fact that there is 
also exploitation in technological diversification (Montgomery, 1994). For example, 
Miller (2006) defines technological diversification as the “breadth of a body of 
knowledge and from how far a firm pursues in a knowledge network” (Miller, 2006: 
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606). This concept, on the one hand, regards technological diversification as exploration, 
which can be understood as firms engaging in explorative activities to search for 
knowledge and reduce the risk of innovation. On the other hand, this concept also 
emphasises how firms adopt exploitative activities to refine their knowledge and deepen 
their understanding of expanded technology domains. Angelo, Antonio Messeni, and 
Achille Claudio (2017) acknowledge that firms who undertake explorative 
technological diversification may “not be able to develop sufficient capabilities and 
understanding in each technology domain” (Angelo et al., 2017: 1251). Their work 
implies that exploitative activities in multiple technologies are necessary. In this chapter, 
I try to understand technological diversification from a mechanical view with the 
combination of exploration and exploitation dimensions at the same time. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the technological diversification-firm performance relationship 
from an institutional view, a perspective that takes different foundation from 
mechanical view. According to the logic of consequentiality, technological 
diversification is considered ‘atomic behaviour’ and ‘instrumental actions’ to influence 
output from a mechanical view. The logic of appropriateness from an institutional view, 
by contrast, emphasises socially constituted and culturally framed rules and taken-for-
granted norms (March & Olsen, 2008). In this sense, firms choose to expand their 
technology scope as a response to institutional pressure and to achieve isomorphism, 
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that is, to be legitimated by key constituencies and get access to resources (Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). In this chapter, I thus try to 
understand technological diversification from the logic of appropriateness, which has 
been largely ignored in the previous literature. According to this logic, technological 
diversification is a way to seek social approval and recognition, which increases the 
survival rate and secures support from key constituents. This concept of technological 
diversification eclipsed the long-standing notion that technological diversification is 
firms’ intentional strategic planning to seek profit. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates the technological diversification-firm performance relationship 
by combining the mechanical and institutional views. Building on the strategic balance 
viewpoint (Deephouse, 1999; Zuckerman, 2016), I argue that firms should reach a 
balance between differentiation and conformity in technological diversification that can 
generate abnormal rents for them. That is to say, there is a need for a trade-off between 
technological diversification as a differentiation strategy from a mechanical view and a 
conformity strategy from an institutional view. A singular focus on either differentiation 
or compliance could be detrimental to firms’ performance. In other words, moderate 
technological diversification conformity can contribute to firm performance, while low 
or high compliance does not. A high level of technological diversification conformity 
will result in a firm facing severe competition and generating low rents, while a low 
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level of technological diversification conformity will lead to firm suffering from 
legitimacy challenges that will compromise firm performance. In this chapter, I try to 
prove the trade-off hypothesis in two ways. First, I multiply technological 
diversification, which combines the explorative and exploitative perspectives, by 
technological diversification conformity. If the coefficient of this interaction is negative 
and significant, the replacement effect between differentiation and compliance in terms 
of technological diversification will be concluded. Second, I try to investigate the non-
linear relationship of technological diversification conformity. If the inverse U-shaped 
relationship is observed, then we can confirm that there is a trade-off between 
differentiation and compliance in terms of technological diversification.  
 
Chapter 6 summarises the empirical findings of the previous chapters and integrates 
them into a framework. Moreover, I point out some fundamental mechanisms that may 
change the technological diversification-firm performance relationship that this PhD 
thesis does not address. I mainly concentrate on the boundary conditions of 
technological diversification discussed in previous chapters. However, there may also 
be a mediation effect that may alter the technological diversification-firm performance 
relationship. I thus review the recent and related literature and suggest potential 
mediators to encourage future research. 
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1.5 Why China? 
I chose China as the research setting for several reasons. First, as an emerging economy, 
China lacks well-established institutions such as market infrastructure and legal 
systems. In Western countries, firms’ strategies rely less on these institutions, as they 
are largely taken for granted and it is easy to forget the various norms and regulations 
that promote economic transactions (Ingram & Silverman, 2002). Therefore, 
institutions “[fade] into the background as control variables” (Meyer and Peng, 2016: 
14). However, in emerging economies such as China, institutions are pushed to centre 
stage and “directly determine what arrows a firm has in its quiver” (Ingram and 
Silverman 2002: 16). This makes China an ideal context in which to study the roles of 
institutions.  
 
Second, I had easy access to the data on Chinese firms. SIPO provides comprehensive 
and detailed data for Chinese firms, which I used to calculate the technological 
diversification. Moreover, CSMAR also provides accurate firm-level financial and 
other related data, which facilitated my research. As a result, the data available provided 
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Chapter 2 Data and Methodology 
To carry out empirical analysis, it is necessary to select appropriate data sources and 
methodology. This chapter aims to describe the data sources used in this PhD thesis and 
introduce the dataset compilation for the practical analysis in detail. Previous research 
has adopted various methods to study firms’ diversification, including case studies 
(Watanabe, Matsumoto, & Hur, 2004), managerial surveys (Beattie, 1980), literature 
reviews (Martin & Sayrak, 2003) and econometric regressions (Acosta, Coronado, & 
Martínez, 2015; Corradini & De Propris, 2015; Corradini et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2016). 
Given that I needed to test the diversification-firm performance relationship based on 
different theoretical perspectives, this PhD thesis adopted econometric analysis in each 
empirical chapter. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 elaborates the two 
key database sources adopted in this PhD thesis, namely the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and the patent database from the State 
Intellectual Property Office of the People's Republic of China (SIPO). Section 3.2-3.4 
expatiates on the data collection, the variable definitions, and the econometric 
configurations for Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
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2.1 Data source and sample selection 
In order to answer the question regarding how and whether technological diversification 
relates to firm performance, two independent data sources were used at the firm-level 
to test the hypothesis. The first one was CSMAR, from which I collected firm-level 
demographic data including financial data and corporate governance data, among others. 
As I aimed to investigate the relationship between technological diversification and 
firm performance, patent data were also needed to calculate the diversification. In order 
to collect this data, I used a web crawler to search the website of SIPO. The details can 
be found below. 
The China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database 
CSMAR serves as the primary source of information on Chinese stock markets and the 
financial statements of China’s exchange-listed firms. It has been developed by Guo 
Tai An Information Technology (GTA) in collaboration with the University of Hong 
Kong and the China Accounting and Finance Research Centre of Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University; this database covers the ownership, board of directors, and 
financial data of all listed firms in China since 1992 (Greve & Man Zhang, 2017). This 
dataset has been found to be reliable and is used extensively in work regarding Chinese 
firms’ governance performance (Zhang & Qu, 2016), social responsibility behaviour 
(Marquis & Qian, 2014), outward foreign direct investment (Xia, Ma, Lu, & Yiu, 2014) 
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and other related management fields. In this thesis, I select all firms that listed on the 
main board of Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. 
Patent data from the State Intellectual Property Office of the People's Republic of 
China (SIPO) 
SIPO records information about every patent, including the application number, 
publication number, invention title, applicant, priority number, abstract, agent, inventor, 
claims, IPC classification number, publication date and application date. The IPC 
classification number was used to measure firms’ technological diversification; the 
applicant was used as the keyword to match the listed firms; and the application date 
was used to identify the year to calculate the technological diversification. However, 
these data are not available for large-scale download. As a result, I used a web crawler 
to download the data following two steps. 
 
First, I drew on the WIND database, a Compustat-style database used in China to 
identify the names of listed Chinese firms, their former names (if any), and their 
subsidiaries (see http://www.wind.com.cn). This approach was necessary because listed 
firms often change their names or establish new subsidiaries when the ownership 
structure changes. Second, I used the listed firms’ names as the key variable and 
matched this content to the web crawler on SIPO’s website (http://www.pss-
system.gov.cn/sipopublicsearch/portal/uiIndex.shtml). Below is the user interface of 
SIPO; the web crawler searched the patent application of each listed firm. 




Figure 2- 1  The user interface that identifies the patent applicant in Chinese 
 
 
Figure 2- 2 The user interface that identifies the patent applicant in English 
 
2.1.1 Data selection 
Figure 2-3 illustrates the raw data that I downloaded from SIPO. The dataset contains 
the firm ID, which I needed to identify the unique name of the listed firms, the 
application number and the application date, which I used to calculate the year of the 
technological diversification, and the publication number, the publication date, and 
most importantly the IPC, which I used to calculate the technological diversification. 
In total there are 846,838 observations in my dataset. 
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Figure 2- 3 Raw data 
 
 
Figure 2- 3 Raw data part 2 
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2.1.2 Data cleaning 
In order to unpack the IPC data to construct technological diversification, I first needed 
to classify each patent into one of eight patent classifications (see Appendix A for more 
details). The first letter of the IPC indicates whether the patent belongs to one of eight 
classifications. As a result, I needed to extract the first letter in each patent’s IPC. Below 
is the Stata code for the identification of the patent class. 
 
 
Figure 2- 4 Extract patent IPC with Stata 
 
Then I aggregated the patent application numbers by firms’ ID and year of patent 
application (I also needed to unpack the year, month and day from the variable 
application date). In this PhD thesis, I used an entropy measurement to calculate the 
technological diversification. Most studies have debated the merits of this measurement. 
Jacquemin and Berry (1979) demonstrated that the entropy value is a more effective 
measurement of the degree of diversification. They compared diversification values 
using the Herfindahl index and entropy index and confirmed the validity of the entropy 
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measurement. The following empirical chapters all used this dataset to compute the 
construct and conduct empirical regression. 
 
 
Figure 2- 5 patent data used in this thesis 
2.1.3 Data and a glance 
Figure 2-6 illustrates the patent applications by year and class. As seen in figure 2-6, 
class B (Performing operations; Transporting) and class H (Electricity) have the most 
applications between 2003 and 2014. Applications increased from 2003, although there 
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Figure 2- 6 Patent application by year and class 
 
 
2.2 Economic Method 
In the following empirical chapters, the dependent variable is the same- firm 
performance - which I measured as Tobin’s Q. The reasons why I chose this construct 
are listed below. Following previous research on firm performance that used Tobin’s Q 
(e.g. Blundell, Bond, Devereux, and Schiantarelli (1992); (Kor & Mahoney, 2005)) and 
the panel data nature of the sample, I adopted panel data regression in the following 
empirical chapters, with a Hausman test to choose between a fixed and random model. 
The tests all showed that a random panel data model fitted the sample and thus the fixed 
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model was rejected. The other reason that why I choose the random effect model is that 
my theoretical interest concerns the between-firm variance and there are time-invariant 
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Chapter 3 Technological diversification and firm performance-A 
mechanical view 
3.1 Introduction 
Firms’ technology capabilities not only drive regional and national growth, but are also 
considered an impetus for corporate growth (Lai, Chiu, & Liaw, 2010a). While product 
lifetimes have become shorter because of the accelerating pace of technological change, 
the fight against obsolescence is raising new and unprecedented challenges. To cope 
with these challenges, firms are investing more in research and development (R&D) in 
a broad range of technology domains. This increased investment in R&D can result in 
economies of scope, enhance absorptive capacity, reduce the risk involved in R&D, and 
create synergies across technologies (Chiu et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2016; Lai, Chiu, 
Liaw, & Lee, 2010b). More and more firms are therefore investing in research to 
diversify their technology portfolios. 
 
The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a significant increase in research 
into technological diversification, which primarily focused on the relationship between 
technological diversification and firm performance (Lai & Weng, 2013; Miller, 2006). 
However, the empirical findings of prior studies have been mixed, which calls into 
question assumptions regarding the relationship between the two variables. 
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I suggest three reasons, from a mechanical view, that can explain the mixed findings 
regarding the technological diversification and firm performance relationship. First, the 
measures of diversification that previous studies have used are incomplete. The current 
operationalisation effectively measures ‘the breadth of a body of knowledge’, but 
ignores ‘how far a firm pursues links in the knowledge network’ (Miller, 2006), which 
can potentially result in inconsistent findings. That is to say, previous research 
concentrates only on exploration in regard to technological diversification but 
overlooks the exploitative activities associated with diversification. Understanding how 
exploitative technological diversification contributes to firm performance would not 
only provide a finer-grained view of exploitation in multiple technologies, but also seek 
to distinguish between two previously conflated forms of technological diversification, 
which may encourage further research on both perspectives. Second, the mixed results 
suggest that technological diversification only serves as an asset or resource for certain 
firms. Technological diversification serves as a zero-level capability in a high-tech firm, 
enabling it to get by, but in other firms, such diversification can serve as a first-order or 
higher-order capability, which could potentially drive performance (Winter, 2003). In 
this chapter, I define higher-order capabilities are those routines that allow firms to learn 
new routines which can confer firms with better performance (Adler, Goldoftas, & 
Levine, 1999). On the other hand, zero-level capabilities are those resources which can 
Chapter 3 Technological diversification and firm performance-A mechanical view 
38 
only make firms survive in the industries (Winter, 2003). In this case, the capabilities 
may not necessarily contribute to firm performance as they are not unique and scare 
resources (Barney, 1991). Different sample selection procedures thus also lead to 
different empirical results. Third, the inconsistencies in the studies’ findings also 
prompt us to see the link between technological diversification and performance from 
a contingency perspective (Su, Guo, & Sun, 2017). While technological diversification 
is important to firms, it does not automatically lead to superior performance; rather, 
firms require certain resources to profit from technological diversification (Leten et al., 
2007; Ravichandran, Liu, Han, & Hasan, 2009). Therefore, the relation between 
technological diversification and firm performance may be contingent on firms’ 
resources. 
 
As these three factors affect the primary assumptions that underlie the research, 
empirical findings based on these varying assumptions can hardly be compared; in 
addition, findings that do not measure technological diversification correctly can hardly 
be expected to produce an accurate estimation of the positive, negative, or curvilinear 
link between technological diversification and firm performance. To bridge this 
research gap, I adopt a three-step model to solve the problems. First, I construct a new 
measure of technological diversification, which captures how firms explore and exploit 
new technological opportunities; it combines how broad (breadth) a firm’s technology 
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portfolio is, and how far (depth) a firm pursues each technology portfolio. Second, I try 
to investigate the different roles of technological diversification, since it can serve as a 
zero-level capability in high-tech firms or as a first- or higher-level capability in low-
tech firms. Thus, I answer the second question: does technological diversification 
represent different kinds of capabilities in terms of promoting firms’ performance? 
Third, I investigate the contingency effects of other firm assets. Complementary assets 
have been found to be pivotal in leveraging firms’ research resources and technology 
portfolios, leading to superior performance (Rothaermel & Hill, 2005). This important 
factor, however, has not been considered in other studies on the impact of technological 
diversification on performance. 
 
This chapter makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, I conceptualise 
and construct a technological diversification measurement that is more comprehensive 
than the measures used in previous studies. The model proposed in this chapter accounts 
for the exploitative perspective of technological diversification in addition to its variety 
(March, 1991). The majority of the research on technological diversification 
concentrates on the relative distribution of technology portfolios, while ignoring how 
well firms perform in each of these sectors. I test the technological diversification-firm 
performance relationship using a more comprehensive measurement of technological 
diversification, and subsequently, extrapolate its effects on firms’ performance. Second, 
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I propose that another reason for the inconsistencies is that the order of technological 
diversification as a capability affects the relationship between technological 
diversification and firm performance. The literature mainly draws its theoretical 
grounding from the resource-based view (RBV), which classifies technological 
diversification as a firm capability (Chen et al., 2013). Although this is true, the 
literature does not differentiate between capabilities that can help a firm just get by 
financially or achieve superior performance (Collis, 1994). In this chapter, I try to 
incorporate this important concept into the research to explain the inconsistencies in 
studies on technological diversification. Finally, I test the effect of a new moderating 
factor – complementary assets – in the technological diversification-performance 
relationship. The role of complementary assets has long been recognised in facilitating 
R&D and technology capture (Swink & Nair, 2007). However, previous research only 
considers the roles of tangible complementary assets (e.g. Chiu et al. (2008) and Lai et 
al. (2010b)) while overlooking the effects of intangible complementary assets. In this 
chapter, I continue to take a contingency view on technological diversification, since it 
has previously been shown to be an effective way of explaining the technological 
diversification-performance relationship (Gao, Xie, & Zhou, 2015). 
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3.2 Theoretical background and hypothesis  
3.2.1 Dimensions of technological diversification 
Exploration and exploitation were originally developed in the context of organisational 
learning. However, since March (1991) publication, scholars have extended this 
conceptual framework to a variety of managerial contexts, including strategic 
management (He & Wong, 2004; Yang, Zheng, & Zhao, 2014), technology and 
innovation management (Martini, Laugen, Gastaldi, & Corso, 2013), organisational 
theory (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008), international business (Stettner & Lavie, 2014) and 
managerial economics (Schrettle, Hinz, Scherrer -Rathje, & Friedli, 2014). 
 
This chapter adopts the exploration-exploitation framework in regard to technological 
diversification. Explorative technological diversification refers to the extent to which 
firms search for possible technological domains and how well their technology 
portfolios are expanded. On the other hand, exploitative technological diversification 
refers to the extent to which firms utilise, refine and deepen their understanding of 
expanded technology portfolios, and thus build a comparative technological advantage. 
This discrimination is in line with the concept proposed by Miller (2006). He defines 
technological diversification as the “breadth of a body of knowledge and from how far 
a firm pursues in a knowledge network” (Miller, 2006: 606). This concept, on the one 
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hand, regards technological diversification as exploration, which can be understood as 
how firms engage in explorative activities to search for knowledge and reduce the risks 
of innovation. On the other hand, this concept also emphasises how firms adopt 
exploitative activities to refine their knowledge and deepen their understanding of 
expanded technology domains. 
 
Explorative technological diversification has been studied extensively. The antecedents 
of explorative technological diversification have been found to be an organisation’s 
inheritance, which includes its corporate strategy, competencies, firm culture (Tidd & 
Trewhella, 1997) and technological resources (Miller, 2004). The outcomes of 
explorative technological diversification, especially its financial implications, have also 
drawn much attention. However, the empirical findings of prior studies are mixed. 
Evidence of a positive linear relationship (Subramanian, Choi, Lee, & Hang, 2016), a 
negative relationship (Chakrabarti, Singh, & Mahmood, 2007), and a curvilinear 
relationship (Benito‐Osorio et al., 2012; Huang & Chen, 2010; Leten et al., 2007) has 
been found in the literature. Moreover, the moderating effects of explorative 
technological diversification and firm performance have also been documented 
extensively. 
 
On the other hand, technological diversification can also be understood as exploitation, 
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which relates to how well other competitors do in those expanded technologies 
(Belderbos, Faems, Leten, & Looy, 2010). Empirically, firms can be both versatile in 
multiple technologies and at the same time have a comparative advantage in these 
expanded fields. For example, after empirically analysing the technological trajectory 
of Canon since the 1990s, Watanabe et al. (2004) found that Canon had expanded its 
technology portfolios to 33 technological fields, and had a comparative advantage in 
several fields over its competitors (e.g. Sony and NEC). After investigating technology 
collaboration between firms and public research organisations (PROs), Angelo et al. 
(2017) acknowledged that firms with explorative technological diversification might 
“not be able to develop sufficient capabilities and understanding in each technology 
domain” (Angelo et al., 2017: 1251). Their work implies that exploitative activities in 
multiple technologies are necessary. Beyond that, theoretically, Montgomery (1994) 
asserts the importance of studying exploitative diversification, stating that “a firm with 
insignificant positions in a number of markets will not, in sum, have conglomerate 
power” (Montgomery, 1994: 165). 
 
The two perspectives of technological diversification are based on different levels of 
research, one on the inter-firm level and the other on the intra-firm level (Belderbos et 
al. 2010). However, as mentioned in the introduction, although exploitative 
technological diversification has been found empirically and theoretically, the research 
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on its implications is limited. 
3.2.2 Measurements of technological diversification 
Many measures of technological diversification rely mostly on intra-firm characteristics. 
These include the entropy measure (Miller, 2004), the Herfindahl index (Lu & Beamish, 
2004), the Blau index (Lahiri, 2010), counts of SIC codes (Sabherwal & Sabherwal, 
2005) and the calculation of the distance between two vectors, as proposed by Gang, 
Choi, and Kim (2014). The measurements can be grouped into three main types: variety 
measurements, variety/balance measurements, and disparity measurements (Stirling, 
2007). 
 
Variety measurements involve counting the SIC codes of a firm’s products in order to 
identify the number of categories covered by the firm’s technology portfolio. This type 
of metric aims to establish how many different types of technologies a company owns: 
the greater the variety, the greater the technological diversification. However, this 
measure only considers the number of sectors in which a firm might be active, and 
ignores how well firms are performing in each category. 
 
Variety/balance measurements include the entropy measure, the Herfindahl index, the 
Blau index, and their variations; these measurements track the number of categories as 
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well as technology patterns across categories. This type of metric aims to capture how 
much of each type of technology a firm has: the greater the variety/balance, the greater 
the technological diversification. This type of measure takes into account the number 
of categories in which a firm might be active as well as the relative distribution of 
technological activity across the categories (Zander, 1997); however, it ignores how 
well firms are performing in each category. 
 
Disparity measurements involve calculating the distance between two vectors, and thus 
examining the differences in the types of technologies that firms possess. This type of 
measurement tries to capture the essence of technological diversification by calculating 
the distance between focal firms’ technology portfolios and a reference based on some 
form of distance measure. The greater the disparity, the greater the technological 
diversification. This type of measurement is less commonly used in the literature, as it 
draws attention to the bilateral relationship between focal firms and reference points 
(Du et al., 2015). In addition, the measurement does not provide information on how 
well firms performed in each category. 
 
The existing measurements of technological diversification all focus on explorative 
technological diversification while ignoring exploitation (Miller, 2006). Let us consider 
the entropy measure, the most popular metric for tracking technological diversification. 
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Suppose we have two firms, A and B, which have patents in two classes of technology, 
C and D. If firm A patented one technology in class C and one in class D, while firm B 
patented 100 in class C and 100 in class D, both firms are equally diversified at 0.69 
based on entropy algorithms. Traditional measures do not discriminate between these 
two firms but see them as equally competitive. This is illustrated in Figure 3-1. In the 
technology market, however, a firm with 100 patents is more competitive than a firm 
with one patent. In other words, traditional measures only depict one part of 
technological diversification – the breadth of technological diversification. However, 
research on strategy management, which underscores how well a firm can perform in a 
certain field (Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009) also reminds us that 
exploitation matters (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Laursen & Salter, 2006). 
 
In addition, traditional measures of technological diversification are sensitive to firms’ 
portfolio composition, which can create ambiguities (Robins & Wiersema, 2003). A 
more comprehensive measure that accounts for both the exploration and exploitation of 
technological diversification is thus needed to better capture the role of technological 
diversification in promoting firms’ competitive advantage (Morescalchi & Hardeman, 
2015). Arguably, a comprehensive technological diversification measure should capture 
both how firms explore (technological diversification breadth) and how they exploit 
(technological diversification depth) new technological opportunities (Lai et al., 2010a). 












Firm A Firm B
Technological diversification 0.69 Technological diversification 0.69
 
Figure 3- 1 Example of technological diversification measurement of entropy 
 
 
3.2.3 Hypothesis  
Following the definition given in this chapter, I argue that technological diversification 
that combines exploration and exploitation has a positive effect on firms’ performance. 
Also, it should be noted that a firm can simultaneously widen and deepen its 
technological diversification (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). That is, one dimension 
of technological diversification may help actualise the effect of the other, enabling the 
company to achieve economies of scale and scope (Cao, Gedajlovic, & Zhang, 2009). 
 
First, explorative technological diversification can improve exploitative technological 
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diversification, which can help the company avail itself of certain economies of scale. 
In this sense, expansion to other technological domains enables firms to cultivate 
individual categories more extensively, which helps them to achieve the depth-cross-
fertilise effect. For example, consider the case study of Canon provided by Watanabe et 
al. (2004). Between 1976 and 2000, Canon extended its technology portfolios, while 
subsequently gaining a competitive advantage in related domains. Watanabe et al. (2004) 
argue that this was perhaps because as firms invest in more technologies, they equip 
themselves with related and unrelated knowledge and resources, which leads to an 
increase in technological diversification depth. The accumulation of knowledge in other 
technology fields, the hiring of new employees, and increased collaboration between 
experts working in related fields all contribute to high technological diversification. 
 
Similarly, high technological diversification exploitation can increase explorative 
technological diversification, which can enable firms to achieve certain economies of 
scope. This is mainly because exploitative technological diversification requires 
repeated investment in one category, and innovation in the same domain enables firms 
to develop a deeper understanding of related knowledge. Technological diversification 
depth can be described as an incremental innovation whereby an existing product or 
service is made better, faster or cheaper (Nelson & Winter, 1985). To achieve this goal, 
firms must recombine and reconfigure their existing knowledge and resources to 
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develop dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007) that will help them find new routes to 
explore new markets and technologies (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). Moreover, the 
absorptive capacity literature describes this practice of learning new routines as a 
typical example of absorptive capacity, which enables firms to sense, seise and 
reconfigure technology opportunities, leading to a higher degree of technological 
diversification breadth (Zahra & George, 2002). Thus, I propose: 
H3.1: Technological diversification combining exploration and exploitation has a 
positive effect on firms’ performance. 
Levels of technological diversification as an organisational capability 
 
I have thus shown that technological diversification can increase firms’ performance. 
However, as proposed by Collis (1994), the role of such organisational capabilities 
needs to be considered with some caveats. He argues that firms’ capabilities are 
vulnerable to threats of erosion and substitution, and, above all, to being superseded by 
a higher-order capability of the ‘learning to learn’ variety (Collis, 1994). Organisational 
capabilities are not the ‘ultimate’ source of competitive advantage, and as Collis (1994) 
concludes, these capabilities are context dependent. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) 
further extend this idea and propose that zero-level capabilities only permit firms to get 
by financially, whereas higher-level capabilities give firms certain advantages. In other 
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words, capabilities are locally defined. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) provide an 
example of an R&D lab whose production of a new product is only a zero-level 
capability, which means that the lab can only survive alongside the competition. This 
shows that inconsistencies may also result from differences in sample selection 
procedures. If, for example, scholars select samples in which technological 
diversification serves as a higher-order capability, they are likely to identify a positive 
relationship between the two variables. In contrast, if the sample consists of firms for 
which technological diversification is a zero-level capability, no correlations are likely 
to exist between technological diversification and performance, and there may even be 
negative effects. If samples are made up of mixed firms, some with zero- and others 
with higher-order capabilities, non-linear or inverse U-shaped relationships are more 
likely. 
 
This problem highlights why it is necessary for scholars to identify typical firm 
characteristics when considering the relation between technological diversification and 
performance. For high-tech firms competing in a highly competitive industry, 
technological diversification is only a ‘how we earn a living now’ capability. For 
example, aircraft engine manufacturers continue to diversify into multiple technologies 
because their competitors have the same kind of expertise (Prencipe, 2005). In such 
cases, technological diversification is a capability that enables firms only to meet the 
Chapter 3 Technological diversification and firm performance-A mechanical view 
51 
minimum criterion of survival alongside the competition, making it a zero-level 
capability. In other words, technological diversification helps firms survive rather than 
make a profit.  
 
Following this logic, I will explore the difference in the effect of technological 
diversification on firm performance in the cases of high-tech and low-tech firms. In 
high-tech firms, technological diversification is arguably less effective than in low-tech 
firms, as technological diversification only helps high-tech firms survive, while in low-
tech firms it acts as a higher-order capability that drives firm performance. Thus: 
 
H3.2: Technological diversification is more effective in promoting firms’ performance 
in low-tech firms than in high-tech firms. 
The roles of complementary assets 
Teece (1986) was the first to propose the concept of complementary assets, defining 
them as resources or capabilities that allow firms to capture profits associated with 
technological innovation. Firms need complementary assets to profitably implement 
new technology strategies (Rothaermel, 2001). Without these complementary assets, 
new technologies and resource reconfigurations would be meaningless (Christmann, 
2000). Teece (1986) identified three different kinds of complementary assets: first, 
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generic complementary assets, or general purpose assets that do not need to be tailored 
to the innovation in question; second, specialised complementary assets, where the 
innovation depends on the complementary asset; and third, cospecialised 
complementary assets, which involve bilateral dependence. Teece (1986) argues that 
specialised complementary assets are more important to firms since they cannot be 
easily replicated, while generic complementary assets can be purchased in the market. 
Even if other firms imitate a technology resource, they will not profit from it if they 
cannot replicate the complementary assets. Empirical evidence has established the role 
of complementary assets in assisting with exploitative alliances (Colombo, Grilli, & 
Piva, 2006), patenting propensity (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006), and information 
technology implementation (Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997). 
 
In the context of this study, the existence (or absence) of complementary assets can 
explain why empirical studies on technological diversification have reached different 
conclusions. Only firms with complementary assets can successfully commercialise 
innovative products and make profits from them. In this study, complementary assets 
are defined as the assets that a firm needs in order to make profits from multiple 
technology fields. Complementary assets, therefore, moderate the relationship between 
technological diversification and firm performance. In this chapter, I test typical 
specialised complementary assets – intangible complementary assets that cannot be 
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purchased in the market and facilitate the commercialisation of technology resources. 
Thus: 
 
H3.3: Complementary assets positively moderate the relationship between 
technological diversification and firm performance. 
3.3Data and Method 
3.3.1 Sample 
The data used in this study come from two main sources. First, I accessed the data from 
the State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China (SIPO) on 
patents filed by Chinese listed firms. SIPO records information on every patent, 
including the application number, publication number, invention title, applicant name, 
priority number, abstract, agent, inventor, claims, International Patent Classification 
(IPC) number, publication date and application date. From this data, I used the IPC 
classification number to measure firms’ technological diversification; the applicant 
name was used as a keyword to match the patent with listed firms, and the application 
date was used to identify the year. 
 
I then accessed firms’ financial data from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database. CSMAR is one of the largest databases of information 
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on Chinese stock markets and the financial statements of Chinese listed firms. In China, 
every listed firm has a stock ID that can be used to identify the company. The firm ID 
was used to match the financial data and the patent data downloaded from SIPO. 
3.3.2. Measurements 
Dependent variable 
There are many measurements of firms’ performance, and they can be mainly grouped 
into two types: accounting measures and market measures. Accounting measures 
include Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Return on Sales (ROS). 
There are three main arguments against accounting-based measurements of firm 
performance. First, they are simply the reflection of past performance and are not 
forward-looking; second, they are not adjusted for risk; and finally, they will be 
distorted by temporary disequilibrium effects, tax laws, and accounting conventions 
(Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, & Konsynski, 1999). 
 
Scholars in organisational learning have argued that a company’s technological 
trajectory can be characterised as path-dependent and will affect the firm’s performance 
in the long run (Fai, 2003). In terms of technological diversification, I suggested that it 
may take years before firms can get the profit from this strategy. As a result, a forward-
looking measurement of firms’ performance rather than backwards-looking metrics 
such as ROA is needed to study the relationship between technological diversification 
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and firm performance. 
 
 
Instead of using accounting-based measurements, scholars in innovation research have 
adopted market-based measurements to better capture firms’ performance. Tobin's Q 
has been suggested to use in the literature by indicating its advantage in capturing firms’ 
short-term performance as well as long-term performance (Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, 
& Eilert, 2013). As this performance measurement is forward-looking, risk-adjusted, 
and less susceptible to changes in accounting practices (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 
1988), providing a simple metric to operationalise both short- and long-term 
performance effects using a single performance variable (Kor & Mahoney, 2005). In a 
simulation study, Sauaia and Castro (2002) found that that company with a high 
performance exhibited a higher value for Tobin’s q than those with a poor performance. 
In addition, Tobin's q demonstrates aspects of the companies' future tendencies that may 
better fit the situation of this study. Thus, I use Tobin’s Q as the proxy of firm 
performance, which is defined as the market value of assets divided by the total assets 





=                                             (equation 3-1) 
 
 
Where MV is the market value of firms. It is calculated as: 
(Total shares -B Share) ×Closing price of A share + B Share × Closing price ×Exchange 
Rate. TA is the total assets disclosed in the balance sheet 





In this chapter, the independent variable is technological diversification. To generate a 
more comprehensive metric to capture this variable, I construct separate measures to 
capture technological diversification depth and breadth and then combine them for a 
compound construct. 
 
Explorative Technological diversification: This variable captures the number of fields 
in which a firm operates. Here, I use the mainstream entropy measurement proposed by 
Jacquemin and Berry (1979). This takes into account the number of technology fields 
in which a firm might be active, as well as the relative distribution of technological 







Explorative TD P P
=
=                                (equation 3-2) 
 
Where jP  in the present context represents the share of firms’ patents in the thj  
technology. In this chapter, I use the standard IPC classification system of patents, 
which contains eight major sections. Thus, jP denotes the relative distribution of thj  
technology in all eight major sections. The value of the entropy measure ranges between 
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zero and ln  n . A higher index of explorative technological diversification means that 
a firm has a broader range of technology portfolios, while a lower index indicates that 
a firm concentrates its resources on a narrower range of technologies. 
 
Exploitative Technological diversification: This variable measures how well a firm 
performs in multiple fields. A firm with high technological diversification depth should 
have an advantage over its rivals. Thus, instead of computing this variable on the basis 












                                   (equation 3-3) 
 
Where ijX   represents the firm i’s patent applications in class j  . The relative 
proportion of the number of patents that a firm has in a technology reflects the 
comparative advantage of that firm in that technology field. 
 
Following this logic, I construct a measure of technological diversification by 
multiplying exploitative and explorative technological diversification. This measure of 
overall technological diversification considers both the comparative technological 
strength in multiple technologies (depth) and how well firms expand into multiple 
technologies (breadth). This contributes to the literature by providing a meaningful 
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Types of firms: In this chapter, I differentiate between high-tech and low-tech firms to 
test H2. Previous studies on Chinese listed firms have differentiated between high-tech 
and low-tech firms based on survey methods, particularly the work done by scientific 
parks such as Zhongguancun Science Park in Beijing (Dai & Liu, 2009; Zhou & Xin, 
2003), as well as scientific parks in other provinces (Xiao, 2011). In this chapter, I try 
to develop a criterion that can better differentiate between high-tech and low-tech 
Chinese listed firms. In 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
published ‘Guidelines for the Industry Classification of Listed Companies’,2 which 
stated that firms in several industries are high-tech firms. These include firms operating 
in raw chemical materials and chemical products (C43); chemical fibres (C47); 
electronics (C5); instruments, meters, cultural, and clerical machinery (C78); 
pharmaceuticals (C8); and information technology (G). A binary variable is thus 
introduced here: 1 for high-tech firms and 0 for low-tech firms.  
 
                                                   
2 Revised in 2012. In the 2012 version, a new industry code was constructed that was different from the 2001 version. 
However, CSMAR provides both codes for listed firms. I thus use the 2001 industry code to identify high- and low-
tech firms. 
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Intangible Complementary assets(CA): According to Lai et al. (2010b), qualitative and 
quantitative research has confirmed that if a firm owns complementary assets that 
enable it to commercialise innovative resources and ideas, the firm has a competitive 
advantage. In this chapter, I explore the moderating role of intangible complementary 
assets in the technological diversification-performance relationship. Intangible 
complementary assets, such as brand value and human capital, help firms 
commercialise new products (Teece, 1998). These are hard to purchase in the market 
and difficult for rivals to imitate (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). Thus, according to 
Teece (1986), intangible complementary assets are specialised complementary assets. 
Using the previous formula (Chiu et al., 2008; Lai et al., 2010b), complementary assets 






=               (equation 3-4) 
 
Intangible assets include complementary assets used during concept creation, 
commercialisation and distribution. In this chapter, intangible assets include brand 
value, copyright, rights to use urban land, and so on. To eliminate firm size effect, 
whereby larger firms may have more intangible assets than small firms, the total assets 
of firms are considered. The value-added ratio (VAD ratio) is also included to represent 
the extent to which complementary assets are specialised (Shih-Chang, Nien-Chi, & 
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Jieng-Bin, 2003). In this chapter, the VAD ratio is calculated by dividing the value 
added by the sales of the firm. In the Chinese context, the value added is calculated as 
the sum of the profit, wage expenses, depreciation, welfare expenses, interest and 
taxation.  
 
The VAD ratio captures the firm’s willingness to acquire technology and assets (Chiu 
et al., 2008). A high VAD ratio shows that firms have a higher propensity to utilise 
complementary assets to make profits (Lai et al., 2010b). Thus, following previous 
research (e.g., Chiu et al. (2008); Lai et al. (2010b)), I also add the VAD ratio to 
represent the degree of complementary asset specialisation.  
Control variables 
I control for a number of factors that might affect firm performance. At the firm level, 
the quality of corporate governance has been found to be effective in predicting firms’ 
performance, and independent directors are believed to be an important mechanism in 
constraining large shareholders’ control and ensuring independent and effective firm 
decisions (Higgs, 2003). I thus measure the independent directors (Independent director) 
as a fraction of the overall number of directors. Board size (Board size) denotes the 
availability of firms’ access to resources and their ability to reduce uncertainty in the 
environment. With more people on the board, including non-executives, firms can 
obtain access to different resources through informal links, and this may affect their 
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performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). I use the total number of board members to 
measure this variable. I also include firm size (Firm size), which is measured by the 
natural log of the total assets. Firm age (Age) is deducting the current observation year 
from the year in which the firm was first listed on the stock market. Firms with different 
ages may have different cost structures, which may affect their performance. Leverage 
(Leverage) has been found to affect firm performance and is defined as total debt 
divided by the total assets. ED represents the volatility of changes in profitability within 
the industry that the focal firm is operating (Keats & Hitt, 1988). Following the work 
of Keats and Hitt (1988), I calculate the industry level ED through two steps. I first 
regress the industry profit growth rate with year serving as independent variables. Then 
I divide the standard error of the coefficient by the profit industry means as the 
measurement of environmental dynamism (Chen, Zeng, Lin, & Ma, 2017). The large 
the value, the higher the ED. Environmental munificence (EM) measures the annual 
growth rate of profit/sales in focal firms’ industry (Keats & Hitt, 1988). I employ the 
same method used for constructing ED above. EM is measured as the regression 
coefficients weighted by profit industry mean that capture the growth rate of profits 
(Chen et al., 2017). The large the value, the higher the EM. To control for the time effect 
of policy influence or other unobserved variances associated with time in China’s rapid 
transition process, I introduce year dummies for the period 2003 to 2014. 
3.4 Results  
Table 3-1 summarises the descriptive statistics and the correlations between all of the 
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variables in the analysis.  
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Table 3- 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations3 
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Tobin’s Q 1.91  1.13  1        
2 TD  0.001  0.002 0.07 1       
3 Firm age 11.98  4.95  −0.22  −0.02  1       
4 Independent director 0.37  0.05  0.02  0.01  −0.04  1      
5 Board size 8.94  1.74  −0.16  0.01  0.06  −0.36  1     
6 Firm size 21.64  1.10  −0.46  −0.02  0.20  0.04  0.31  1    
7 leverage 0.38  0.22  −0.44  −0.03  0.19  −0.03  0.19  0.45  1   
8 ED 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.35  −0.08  0.02  0.09  0.14  0.08  1  
9 EM 0.08  0.02  −0.18  0.12  0.07  0.05  0.09  0.24  0.22  0.36  
 
Notes: Dummy variables are not included; All the variables that vary by year are lagged; Sample from 2003 to 2014 
 
 
                                                   
3 The definition and equation can be found at appendix B 
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Table 3-2 presents the statistical analysis results. We can see from Table 3-2 that all of 
the models have been reported using the Wald chi-square test. Model 1 is the base model 
and includes only the control variables. With the help of these four models, I can test 
hypotheses 1 and 2.  
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Table 3- 2 Regression results 
DV: Tobin’s Q Model 1  
Full Sample 






Controls     
Independent director 0.32** 0.29* 0.37** 0.22* 
 (1.97) (1.90) (2.09) (1.89) 
Board size 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.00 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.03) 
Firm size -0.21*** −0.20*** −0.27*** −0.31*** 
 (-24.83) (−14.29) (−13.98) (−24.06) 
Firm age -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.09*** -0.38*** 
 (-4.21) (-3.79) (-4.87) (-2.90) 
Leverage -1.02*** −1.87*** −0.09* −1.66*** 
 (-10.92) (−15.23) (−1.80) (−27.36) 
ED 7.21*** 9.01*** 6.29*** 13.57*** 
 (9.07) (10.87) (4.03) (5.23) 
EM -4.09*** −3.21 −4.23*** −5.21*** 
 (-4.20) (−1.20) (−3.21) (−5.43) 
Predictors     






     
Constant 3.21*** 7.25*** 2.21*** 10.23*** 
 (5.33) (10.47) (6.52) (8.29) 
2  p   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 




⚫ t statistics in parentheses, year dummy variables were included but are not shown in the table 
⚫ p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
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Hypothesis 3.1 predicts that technological diversification is positively linked to firm 
performance. In Model 2, I find that the coefficient of technological diversification is 
positive and significant ( 11.12, 0.05p =   ). This indicates that technological 
diversification has a positive effect on firm performance; thus, Hypothesis 1 is shown 
to be true. Hypothesis 2 predicts that technological diversification is more effective in 
driving performance in low-tech firms than in high-tech firms. Model 3 includes a sub-
sample of low-tech firms, and I find the coefficient of technological diversification to 
be positive and significant at 8.23 (p<0.05). Model 4 includes a sub-sample of high-
tech firms, and I find that the coefficient of technological diversification is insignificant. 
The results indicate that the effect of technological diversification is more significant 
in low-tech firms than in high-tech firms. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
 
Table 3-3 presents the results of the tests for the moderating effects of complementary 
assets. To avoid multicollinearity and construct the interaction effects of technological 
diversification and complementary assets, I standardised both variables. In Model 2, I 
find that the interaction term of technological diversification complementary assets is 
negative ( 0.019,  <0.1p = −  ) which indicating a negatively moderate role of 
complementary assets. I also illustrate the moderating effect of complementary assets 
in Figure 3-2. Overall, I find evidence that the positive effects of technological 
diversification are diluted when combined with the effect of intangible complementary 
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Table 3- 3 Testing moderating effect of complementary assets 
DV: Tobin’s Q Model 1  
 
Model 2 
Controls   
Independent director 0.29* 0.21* 
 (1.90) (1.78) 
Board size 0.002 0.002 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
Firm size −0.20*** −0.27*** 
 (−14.29) (−10.28) 
Firm age -0.03*** -0.01*** 
 (-3.79) (-3.23) 
Leverage −1.87*** −0.23** 
 (−15.23) (−2.21) 
ED 9.01*** 7.26** 
 (10.87) (2.71) 
EM −3.21 −2.31** 
 (−1.20) (−1.99) 
Predictors   




   
TD CA    -0.02* 
(-1.78) 
   
Constant 7.25*** 12.12*** 
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 (10.47) (12.22) 
2  p   0.00 0.00 
 
⚫ t statistics in parentheses 
⚫ p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
⚫ To avoid multicollinearity, technological diversification and complementary assets were standardised 
⚫ Year dummy variables were included but are not shown in the table. 
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter proposes and investigates three potential reasons for the inconsistencies, 
from the mechanical view, in the results of the studies on the relationship between 
technological diversification and firm performance. The first reason is the lack of a 
comprehensive measure to capture the essence of technological diversification; the 
second is the lack of attention paid to the order of technological diversification as a firm 
resource (capability); and, the third reason is the lack of attention paid to contingency 
factors. Based on the panel data on Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2014, this paper 
empirically investigates the three reasons above, which indicates a statistically positive 
relationship between technological diversification and firm performance (measured as 
Tobin’s Q). Although some previous studies have noted the importance of accounting 
for exploitative technological diversification (e.g., Miller (2006), no studies have used 
this dimension in empirical research. My measure of technological diversification 
accounts not only for explorative diversification, as in much of the literature, but also 
for its exploitation. This makes the results more easily translatable into real implications 
for managers. 
 
In addition, my results confirm that technological diversification serves as different 
order capabilities in Chinese listed firms. I find that technological diversification serves 
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as a zero-level capability among high-tech firms, and that diversification, in this case, 
enables firms only to survive in a competitive environment. The findings can be 
explained through the mechanical view in terms of the RBV. Consider a situation that 
a high-tech firm is expanding its technologies, implying that it is fairly diversified. 
Suzuki and Kodama (2004) indicate that firms, especially high-tech firms in the same 
industry, have similar technology trajectories, which would indicate that their rivals 
have an equivalent level of technology diversification. According to RBV, this resource 
(technological diversification) is valuable, common, inimitable and non-substitutable 
(VnRIN). Low-tech firms, in contrast, have varying levels of technology diversification, 
which makes it a valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resource (VRIN) 
(Barney, 1991). In conclusion, to deal with uncertain and rapidly developing new 
technologies, high-tech firms must quickly learn about technological opportunities to 
survive in the industry (Dodgson, 1991). Such actions, however, enable firms only to 
survive rather than to earn a profit. 
 
This finding also has implications for firms in high-tech industries. Firms in these 
industries need to consider their diversification strategies as resources that make a living 
rather than some capabilities that can make better performance. If these firms want to 
profit from the diversification strategy, they should refer to explore and expand more in 
their technology portfolios or exploit in current multiple technologies to acquire the 
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resources that are non-substitutable (Barney, 2001). 
 
In this chapter, I find that intangible complementary assets negatively moderate the 
relationship between technological diversification and firm performance. This implies 
that, with more intangible complementary assets, the effectiveness of technological 
diversification declines. This result is contrary to my expectation; however, it is not new 
in the literature. For example, Chiu et al. (2008) found that production and marketing 
complementary assets have negative moderating effects on firm performance; this 
indicates that complementary assets negatively moderate the relationship between 
external corporate venturing and technological scope. In my study, I believe the 
intangible complementary assets such as brand value and copyrights have a strong lock-
in effect that may reduce the positive effects of diversification. For example, particular 
brand names are tailored to fit certain technologies and products, and these assets are 
difficult or expensive to leverage in the case of new products or technologies. In this 
sense, these intangible complementary assets do not help the company profit from 
technological diversification. Moreover, in the case of limited resources, firms with a 
licensing strategy that is focused on the in-house intellectual property may not be able 
to allocate enough resources to absorb other potential technology capabilities. 
 
The findings of the negative moderating effects of intangible complementary assets 
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may also result from the measurement that used in this chapter. In this chapter, the 
measurement of intangible complementary assets consists of the land use right. 
However, in China, the use of land may prevent firms to explore the profit of 
technologies as the land use right is considered as more valuable, rare, inimitable and 
non-substitutable resource than the technologies. Thus, future research may resort to 
other operationalisation of intangible complementary assets to revisit this finding. 
Limitations 
This study is not without its limitations, and as a consequence, there are areas for future 
research. First, more measurements should be proposed to capture the depth of 
technological diversification. Although the measure I have developed to capture the 
depth of technological diversification is not sophisticated, I believe it can capture, to 
some degree, how far firms pursue technologies in different sectors. However, it is 
necessary to construct other indexes to calculate diversification depth in order to further 
test the validity of this study. Second, my research is also limited by the lack of finer-
grained data showing how different types of diversification – related or unrelated 
diversification – affect firm performance. This is mainly because the IPC data does not 
contain any information similar to the four-digit and two-digit SIC codes used to 
identify related and unrelated diversification. I was limited by the data in constructing 
the measurements, and perhaps future studies could explore this promising research 
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area. Last but not least, this research is based on a single country and uses only a sample 
of Chinese listed firms. Replicating this study in a cross-country context or using a 
larger sample could be a promising way to validate my conclusions. 
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Chapter 4 Technological diversification and firm performance-An 
institutional view 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Technological diversification is a phenomenon that can hardly be ignored (Cantwell, 
Gambardella, & Granstrand, 2004). But, why do firms diversify and how do they 
benefit from multi-field technologies? Many believe that technological diversification 
is a valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN) resource that brings 
synergic effects and thus builds competitive advantage (Lai et al., 2010a; Lai et al., 
2010b). From this perspective, managers can expect higher returns when they expand 
their technological portfolios. 
 
While technological diversification research has advanced our understanding of 
managers’ incentives to expand their technology portfolios, previous studies seldom 
consider the roles of institutions when firms decide to diversity and use the 
diversification to make a profit. Although every economic activity is embedded in 
society and institutions are never merely in the background (Scott, 2013), existing 
research on technological diversification largely depends on the mechanical approach 
and considers institutions as being ‘backstage’. As ‘rules of game’ (North, 1990), 
institutions pushing factors are usually considered to be the background to the ‘front 
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stage’ (Meyer & Peng, 2016) and “directly determine what arrows a firm has in its 
quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy and to create competitive 
advantage” (Ingram and Silverman, 2002: 20 emphasis added). 
 
This neglect of social embeddedness limits the application of technological 
diversification and the precision of its predictions for two main reasons. First, 
institutional theorists suggest institutions such as norms, rules and regulations shape 
firms’ decision-making without even noticing the existence of institutions (Deephouse 
& Suchman, 2008). Since this taken-for-grandness has been taken for granted in 
technological diversification research, failure to identify the role of institutions can 
result in inconsistencies in the findings regarding technological diversification 
consequences. Second, rooted in open system logic (Scott & Davis, 2007), institutions’ 
effect on the consequences of technological diversification may also be shaped by other 
environmental factors. Without considering this boundary effects, the institutional logic 
of technological diversification is also incomplete and may result in mixed findings. 
 
My purpose is to explore how technological diversification conformity affects firm 
performance, from an institutional view, and its boundary conditions. Despite a growing 
consensus that “institutions matter” (Peng, 2013), institutional analysis of technological 
diversification remains in its infancy. The central argument here is that technological 
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diversification is a response to institutional pressure to acquire legitimacy, which 
defines a firm’s success. Here, legitimacy is defined as “a generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, 
574). Also, the boundary conditions of institutional analysis are far from clear and thus 
need further investigation. I offer new theoretical insights by considering environmental 
munificence and environmental dynamism as boundary conditions of this institutional 
logic. 
 
This chapter takes the logic of appropriateness instead of the logic of consequentiality 
in this study. The institutional theory may serve as an antidote to the overly rationalist 
and technocratic perspective (Greenwood et al., 2008) and significantly influence the 
what used to think as market-based activities such as the scope of firms (Peng, Lee, & 
Wang, 2005). From the logic of consequentiality, technological diversification is 
considered ‘atomic behaviour’. In this regard, organisations are ‘atomic organisations’ 
whose technologies and other activities are not clearly separated (Kamps & Pólos, 
1999). However, in the real world and the context of this study, this setting is far from 
the reality as most organisations are complex (Thompson, 1967). Thus, considering 
technological diversification as ‘atomic behaviour’ and organisations as ‘atomic 
organisations’ no longer fits in the contemporary situation. In other words, 
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understanding the organisation as a social mechanism for achieving collective ends has 
become relatively neglected (Greenwood, Hinings, & Whetten, 2014).  
 
The logic of appropriateness, by contrast, emphasises socially constituted and culturally 
framed rules and taken-for-granted norms (March & Olsen, 2008). In this sense, firms 
choose to expand their technology scope as a response to institutional pressure to 
become isomorphic; thus they become legitimated by key constituencies and gain 
access to resources (Greenwood et al., 2011). This furthers our understanding of 
technological diversification through a different logic to explain its effect on 
performance.  
 
In addition, noting that the external environment matters (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), and that “technologies and environments are major sources 
of uncertainty for organisations” (Thompson, 1967: 13), I also test the environment 
boundary for technological diversification conformity. I believe this attempt will 
deepen our understanding of the effectiveness of institutions by integrating with 
contingencies of the external environment. 
 
This chapter aims to make three contributions. First, I extend the diversification 
research by providing a unique lens through which to study technological 
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diversification. Past research takes a functionalist view of technological diversification 
as a rational profit-seeking behaviour undertaken by firms. However it has overlooked 
the fact that every firm action is also socially embedded and defined (Scott, 2013). I 
extend the technological diversification logic by providing a logic of appropriateness 
from an institutional view, instead of the logic of consequentiality that has been used in 
past research. I argue that it is the isomorphism of technological diversification patterns 
legitimated by key constituencies that profits firms rather than diversification as a firm 
resource. Because firms that look like each other can be regarded as having good 
standing in their class and are rewarded for their legitimacy, the technological 
diversifiers have incentives to copy other technological portfolios that are prevailing in 
their organisational field. 
 
Second, I extend institutional theory by refining the boundary effects of institutions. I 
introduce two environmental dimensions: environmental munificence and 
environmental dynamism, as boundary conditions of technological diversification as an 
institutional logic. Institutional theorists have called for the identification of the 
boundaries of institutional theory (Suddaby, 2010). This chapter addresses this issue by 
identifying environmental munificence and environmental dynamism as two 
moderators to investigate the boundary conditions of technological diversification as an 
institution. In this sense, this study deepens our understanding and provides a finer-
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grained model of theoretical prediction (Davis, 2015; Edwards, 2010). 
 
Lastly, I draw attention back to the organisation. As noted by Greenwood et al. (2014): 
“institutional scholarship has become overly concerned with explaining institutions and 
institutional processes, notably at the level of the organisation field, rather than with 
using them to explain and understand organisations” (Greenwood, Hinings, & Whetten, 
2014: 1206). I agree with this. This chapter refocuses how firms’ technological 
diversification as an institutional behaviour and get legitimate and accredited, thus 
profit from legitimacy. In this vein, I consider organisations as a phenomenon that needs 
to be researched and institutions as independent variables. 
4.2 Theory and Hypothesis 
4.2.1 Previous research on technological diversification 
Previous studies have characterised technological diversification as a rational decision 
or strategy that can bring synergy to existing technology portfolios and/or as a resource 
that can be used to build competitive advantage (Corradini & De Propris, 2015; Kim et 
al., 2016; Krammer, 2016). Firms’ successes are thus seen as a response to consistent 
criteria of technical efficiency. When the social embeddedness is considered, however, 
the many possible interpretations of firms’ behaviours and their socially constructed 
characters become obvious, casting doubt on the rationale of the diversification 
Chapter 4 Technological diversification and firm performance-An institutional view 
82 
objectives that the traditional, dominant paradigm puts forward (Boiral, 2003). That is 
to say, this perspective does not “recognise the potential influence of market actors … 
about the sources or criteria of organisational efficiency” (Zajac and Westphal, 2004: 
434). Although external pressures are rarely mentioned in explaining these ‘apparently 
rational’ motives, the implementation of strategies is essentially institutional pressure 
(Boiral, 2007). Seen from this perspective, previous research has considered that 
technological diversification behaviour tends to be rational. However, this practice is 
introduced more for reasons of conformity to the ‘rational myth’ than to project an 
image of rigour, objectivity, precision and control (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
 
In this chapter, I highlight that technological diversification should be considered as 
embedded in a larger social context that confers resources and legitimacy, instead of 
merely considering it as an individual organisation’s rational activity. In this 
institutional view, technological diversification is more like a “rational myth” (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977) than an effective strategy that is rationally designed by managers. As 
suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1991) “institutionalism . . . comprises a rejection 
of rational-actor models often found in efficiency-based research” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991: 8 emphasis added). This, however, does not mean to say that institutional 
constraints completely determine actions or that organisations are non-rational 
(DiMaggio, 1995; Oliver, 1997). Rather, “institutions set bounds on context-rationality 
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by restricting the opportunities and alternatives we receive and, thereby, increase the 
probability of certain types of behaviours” (Barley and Tolbert 1997: 94). It is through 
this context-rationality that organisations “appear to be rational” (Scott, 1983: 160).  
 
Institutional models are most appropriate “where actors are unable either to recognise 
or rationally act upon their interests” (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 244), which is the 
case in this paper . According to institutional theorists, organisational actions are driven 
by the social jurisdiction-an expectation that organisations will achieve societal proven 
and acceptance (Scott, 2013). From this perspective, strategic activities are social and 
normatively defined because their motivations are expected to meet the legitimate 
standard of stakeholders (suppliers, customers, governments) who have the right to 
judge the rightness of the organisational value (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007). In other 
words, strategic and economic activities are social and normatively embedded into a 
larger context to seek proven for its action or legitimacy (Scott, 2008). This legitimacy-
seeking behaviour follows a series of institutional norms or rules (North, 1990) to 
becomes isomorphic with their institutional environment (Dacin, 1997). 
 
From this perspective, institutions are more than background conditions (Peng, Wang, 
& Jiang, 2008). Rather, the yields of technical benefits largely depend on the 
institutional environment of organisations (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009) and 
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legitimation is important for organisations to realise the technical and economic 
benefits (Peng, 2002). That is, “institutions directly determine what arrows a firm has 
in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy and to create 
competitive advantage” (Ingram and Silverman, 2002: 20 emphasis added). What we 
learn here is that when considering technical or economic problems, we should 
remember that technical and economic activities are socially embedded and that we 
cannot ignore the institutions of the organisation, as they serve as an important 
facilitator in realising the potential of technical benefits (Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 
2011). This view may clarify why the rational view of technological diversification, as 
resources or capabilities, fails to provide consistent findings on the technological 
diversification-firm performance relationship. 
4.2.2 Technological diversification-An institutional explanation 
Institutional theorists believe that organisations’ survival depends on their conformity 
to the “rules of the game” (North, 1990), the humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction (Scott, 1987), rather than the efficiency of production (Levy & Egan, 
2003). As Selznick (1996) noted, “perhaps the most significant” aspect of 
institutionalisation is infusion with value beyond the technical requirements of the task 
at hand (Selznick 1996: 217 emphasis added). In this respect, firms use technological 
diversification to manage their interdependence and gain power in the exchange 
network in order to improve organisational autonomy and legitimacy (Pfeffer, 1976). 
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Thus, firms that are willing to diversify do not intentionally seek profit; in fact in most 
cases, they lose benefits after becoming diversifiers (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Firms 
choose to diversify when the external constraints cannot be absorbed or just to avoid 
turbulence due to uncertainties (Xia et al., 2014). 
 
Institutions and institutional environment are composed of three “pillars”: the 
regulatory, cognitive and normative pillars (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Peng & 
Khoury, 2009). These three “pillars” are analogous to DiMaggio and Powell’s coercive, 
mimetic and normative isomorphic process (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this 
institutional vein, technological diversification affects firms’ profit by building 
compliance or legitimacy and reducing uncertainty, mostly through the normative pillar 
(mimetic process) (Peng et al., 2009). Innovations or technological advances are a 
response to environmental turbulence and uncertainty (Calantone, Garcia, & Dröge, 
2003). Uncertainties, however, are also a powerful force that encourages imitation 
(Oliver, 1991). When organisational technologies are poorly understood, or multi-
technology management comes with uncertainty and cost (Leten et al., 2007), 
organisations may model themselves on other organisations (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). In these circumstances, technological diversification or innovation can be 
accounted for by organisational modelling (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). As described 
by Alchian (1950): 
 
While there certainly are those who consciously innovate, there are those who, in their imperfect 
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attempts to imitate others, unconsciously innovate by unwittingly acquiring some unexpected or 
unsought unique attributes which under the prevailing circumstances prove partly responsible 
for the success. Others, in turn, will attempt to copy the uniqueness, and the innovation-imitation 
process continues. 
 
From this institutional perspective, technological diversification is a way to mitigate 
institutional uncertainty in order to achieve a ‘logic of appropriateness’ within 
institutions, defined as socially constituted and culturally framed rules and norms (Peng, 
2001; Schmidt, 2010). Thus, the effect of technological diversification, in an 
institutional manner, should be considered in terms of how homogeneity in a firm’s 
technological portfolio can be achieved and whether this isomorphism affects firm 
performance. This research concept, compared with the rational decision view, focuses 
on the similarity of firms’ technology base and how this resemblance can be regarded 
as a taken-for-granted ‘game of rules’, rather than its productive value in affecting 
resource deployment and further determining firms’ success (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Suddaby, 2010).  
 
By applying the institutional logic of technological diversification, I argue that it is the 
isomorphism of their technological portfolio that affects firms’ success and survival 
rather than technological diversification alone as an organisational attribute. From this 
point of departure, I believe that institutional pressure and legitimacy forces firms to 
look alike and not to be different, for fear that if they do, they will lack credibility 
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(Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002). As the similarity of technology portfolio increases, 
a firm can be rewarded or gain accreditation through resources and assets from agencies 
of repute such as governments, industry associations or professionals (Dacin, Goodstein, 
& Scott, 2002). This will be explained in further detail below. 
4.2.3 Hypothesis 
I argue that conformity in technological diversification should bring firms performance 
benefits for two main reasons. First, conformity ensures greater resource commitment 
from stakeholders to improve firm performance. Diversification into new technological 
areas can be risky and costly, and often shows slower returns in the short-run (Kim et 
al., 2016). Key stakeholders may not, therefore, support or endorse firms’ 
diversification objectives. As discussed above, a range of structures and strategies are 
institutionalised through an iterative isomorphic process that involves all stakeholders. 
These eventually become strategic norms and resemble the governance structures, 
institutional logics and cognitive consensus of others in the same organisational field 
(Suchman, 1995). To avoid potential legitimacy challenges by either internal or external 
stakeholders, firms adopt structures that are similar to those of their peers, thereby 
distracting attention away from controversial core activities that may otherwise not be 
fully supported by stakeholders. Moreover, firms’ mimetic behaviours towards typical 
industry players can be seen as an industry recipe that can increase firms’ chances of 
success and reduce the uncertainty regarding their actions in pursuit of technological 
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diversification (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). By aligning with the strategic norms, firms 
can legitimate their course of action and demonstrate their right to perform 
diversification in a predictable manner. Stakeholders comprehend and accept these 
actions and in turn increase the resource commitment that firms need to grow, such as 
capital from financial institutions, markets by consumers and regulators, and networks 
via suppliers (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). 
 
Second, conformity in regard to technological diversification increases partner 
participation and thus strengthens firm performance. Technological diversification is 
normally achieved through either internal development or external acquisition. 
However, firms are often constrained by their own resources and capability to enlarge 
their technological portfolios. They need to utilise external sources to substitute or 
complement internal R&D (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Wang, Ning, & Chen, 2014). 
Collaborations with external bodies present unique co-ordination challenges because 
knowledge exchange beyond firm boundaries is often hindered by the tacit and firm-
specific nature of knowledge (Ning & Li, 2016). In order to widen their collaborations 
and tap into more external knowledge sources, firms choose to standardise their 
technological operations around a common set of structured appearances and processes 
(Boiral, 2003). Firms with similar diversification structures can thus be easily 
understood and develop structural relationships with resource suppliers and coordinate 
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informal ties such as with trade associations and industry clusters to enlarge their pool 
of collaborators and alliance partners from different technological fields (Norman, Artz, 
& Martinez, 2007). This facilitates greater participation and knowledge exchange from 
all parties, thereby expanding firms’ knowledge base and enabling them to realise the 
performance benefits of conformity (Dacin et al., 2007). Deviations from 
institutionalised structures lead to dissatisfied and confused collaborators, who may 
either reduce the quality and quantity of their participation or demand more resources 
to secure the same level of participation in knowledge exchange (Miller, Le Breton-
Miller, & Lester, 2013). Moreover, although non-conformity strategies may allow firms 
to differentiate themselves in the marketplace and reduce competition, this benefit may 
be offset by the costs of legitimacy challenges and building complex relationships with 
collaborators (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Hence: 
 
H4.1: Firms’ conformity to their industry norms in regard to technological 
diversification is positively associated with firm performance. 
The moderating effects of environmental munificence and dynamism 
The above hypotheses are based on the idea that firms continuously interact with their 
environment and adjust their scope of technological diversification accordingly to 
survive and prosper. Now I consider the characteristics of firms’ environment in order 
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to shed light on how these influence the relationship between technological 
diversification and performance. Extensive previous literature has indicated that the 
major contingency faced by firms is their environment and commonly follow the work 
of Dess and Beard (1984). Drawing on this insight, I focus on the moderating effects of 
two key characteristics of firms’ environment: environmental dynamism and 
munificence.   
 
Environmental dynamism refers to the extent of volatility and unpredictable change in 
a firm’s external environment (Dess & Beard, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 2004). In a highly 
dynamic environment, the uncertainty arising from, e.g. rapid changes in industrial 
structure, consumer tastes, technology and product lifecycles, is increased. As a result, 
firms may suffer from information processing burdens and are also no longer able to 
rely on their past experience in rational decision-making (Chandler, Honig, & Wiklund, 
2005). They are therefore unable to adequately predict changes or future earnings and 
may be forced to delay major initiatives that require significant planning, such as R&D 
investment and technological diversification (Schilke, 2014).  
 
As a result, stakeholders typically prefer short-term and less risky investments (Justin 
Tan & Litsschert, 1994). Information scarcity also causes them to compare how other 
organisations are approaching the situation (Angst, Agarwal, Sambamurthy, & Kelley, 
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2010; Felin & Zenger, 2009). Industrial norms, in this case, serve as a benchmark for 
them to evaluate performance and avoid high market risks. Firms with high conformity 
in regard to technological diversification can thus mitigate uncertainty and attract more 
resources, which allows them to continue to launch and grow new ventures to achieve 
growth (Anglin, McKenny, & Short, 2016). Similarly, these firms can provide a sense 
of predictability for their existing pool of collaborators and continuously benefit from 
flexibility in creating new knowledge and reducing its misfit in adapting to the dynamic 
environment (Wang, Ning, Li, & Prevezer, 2016). Hence: 
 
H4.2: The higher the environmental dynamism, the stronger the relationship between 
firms’ conformity in regard to technological diversification and performance. 
 
Environmental munificence refers to the richness of the external resources that can 
support firms’ sustainable growth (Dess & Beard, 1984). It indicates the extent of the 
external growth and expansion opportunities that are available in the environment. In a 
munificent environment, firms tend to adopt strategies and structures that enable them 
to assess and acquire a variety of resources, thereby capturing growth opportunities 
quickly (Gligor, Esmark, & Holcomb, 2015). Managers have more confidence and 
freedom to pursue long-term strategies (Barney, 1991). They are less constrained by the 
stakeholders due to reduced resource dependency in regard to exploring firms’ networks, 
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working with collaborators and developing new structural relationships to seek and 
exploit new strategic paths (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012). Moreover, as a resource-rich 
environment encourages new entrants and intensifies competition, the main focus for 
firms is to explore new markets and technological opportunities. When adopting 
different strategies and deviating from the strategic norms, firms are more likely to gain 
a distinct position that brings them higher profits and reduces competition (Deephouse, 
1996). 
 
By contrast, in a less munificent and more hostile environment, where resources are 
scarce, firms pay greater attention to conserving their resources (Goll & Rasheed, 2004). 
While firms can rely on internal resources to buffer against the decline in external ones, 
the extent to which firms can pursue distinct value-adding activities is now constrained. 
They face trade-offs between exploring new technological areas and exploiting existing 
areas (Anglin et al., 2016). Withdrawal from low munificence industries is often viewed 
as a valid strategy to overcome resource constraints (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012). 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, firms may face more legitimacy challenges from 
stakeholders regarding their actions in deploying resources away from core 
technological areas. Thus, less strategic conformity decreases firm performance in a 
resource-scarce environment. Hence: 
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H4.3: The higher the environmental munificence, the weaker the relationship between 
firms’ conformity in regard to technological diversification and performance. 
 














Figure 4- 1 Conceptual framework 
 
4.3 Data and Method 
4.3.1 Sample 
To test the hypothesis, I constructed my sample from a combination of sources and 
manually collected firm data. First, I manually collected the patent data of Chinese 
listed firms from the State Intellectual Property Office of the People's Republic of China 
(SIPO) at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/. SIPO records information on every patent, including 
the application number, publication number, invention title, applicant, priority number, 
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abstract, agent, inventor, claims, IPC classification number, publication date and 
application date. The IPC classification number was used to measure firms’ 
technological diversification, the applicant was used as the keyword to match the listed 
firms, and the application date was used to identify the year in order to calculate 
technological diversification. 
 
Then I accessed each listed firm’s financial data from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. CSMAR contains all of the financial data 
collected from the annual reports of Chinese listed firms. In China, every listed firm 
has a stock ID that can be used to identify the company. Thus, this part of the data was 
used to match with the patent data accessed from SIPO using firms’ ID as the matching 
word. This dataset has been found to be reliable and is used extensively in work 
regarding Chinese firms’ governance performance (Zhang & Qu, 2016), outward 
foreign direct investment (Xia et al., 2014), social responsibility behaviours (Zeng, Xu, 
Yin, & Tam, 2012) and other related management fields. 
4.3.2 Measurements  
Dependent variable 
There are many measurements of firms’ performance, and they can be mainly grouped 
into two types: accounting measures and market measures. Accounting measures 
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include Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Return on Sales (ROS). 
There are three main arguments against accounting-based measurements of firm 
performance. First, they are simply the reflection of past performance and are not 
forward-looking; second, they are not adjusted for risk; and finally, they will be 
distorted by temporary disequilibrium effects, tax laws, and accounting conventions 
(Bharadwaj et al., 1999). 
 
Scholars in organisational learning have argued that a company’s technological 
trajectory can be characterised as path-dependent and will affect the firm’s performance 
in the long run (Fai, 2003). In terms of technological diversification, I suggested that it 
may take years before firms can get the profit from this strategy. As a result, a forward-
looking measurement of firms’ performance rather than backwards-looking metrics 
such as ROA is needed to study the relationship between technological diversification 
and firm performance. 
 
 
Instead of using accounting-based measurements, scholars in innovation research have 
adopted market-based measurements to better capture firms’ performance. Tobin's Q 
has been suggested to use in the literature by indicating its advantage in capturing firms’ 
short-term performance as well as long-term performance (Jayachandran et al., 2013). 
As this performance measurement is forward-looking, risk-adjusted, and less 
susceptible to changes in accounting practices (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988), 
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providing a simple metric to operationalise both short- and long-term performance 
effects using a single performance variable (Kor & Mahoney, 2005). In a simulation 
study, Sauaia and Castro (2002) found that that company with a high performance 
exhibited a higher value for Tobin’s Q than those with a poor performance. In addition, 
Tobin's Q demonstrates aspects of the companies' future tendencies that may better fit 
the situation of this study. Thus, I use Tobin’s Q as the proxy of firm performance, which 
is defined as the market value of assets divided by the total assets of the firm. The 





=                                             (equation 4-1) 
 
 
Where MV is the market value of firms. It is calculated as: 
(Total shares -B Share) ×Closing price of A share + B Share × Closing price ×Exchange 
Rate. TA is the total assets disclosed in the balance sheet 
Independent variable 
In this chapter, the independent variable is technological diversification conformity (TD 
conformity), which indicates the similarity in the focal firm’s technology portfolio 
compared with the prevailing standard in the organisational field. This chapter 
conceptualises this as the technological distance between the focal firm and the industry 
average by calculating the extent to which their patents are included in the same 
technology classification. There are two main advantages of using patent classifications 
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to calculate technological diversification conformity. First, patents are classified 
according to the underlying technology by the Patent Office (Flor & Oltra, 2004), 
excluding endogenous interference. Second, compared with patents, end products have 
some limitations in terms of reflecting different technology capabilities. For example, 
similar products may have very dissimilar underlying technologies, making product 
measurement less reliable (Guan & Yan, 2016).  
 
Following previous studies, I first produce each firm’s technology portfolio and then 
construct the technological diversification proximity by computing the uncentred 
correlation of their patent distribution vectors across the technological classifications 
(Garcia-Vega, 2006; Guellec & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001). 
 
The technological diversification conformity between the 
thm  industry average and 
the 
thi  firm in the thm industry is defined as: 
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Where 1 2( , , , , )i i i ijF N N N=  is the technological space of the thi  firm, and ijN  
is the number of patents that the 
thi   firm holds in the technological category j
( (1,2, ,8)j = . This vector is constructed using the distribution of the firm’s patents 
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in the different technological areas. The distance varies between 0 and 1. When there is 
only one listed firm in a given industry, this value equals one; when the technological 
vectors are orthogonal, the measure is zero. 
 
Moderating variables 
Environmental dynamism (ED) and environmental munificence (EM) are the two 
environmental contextual variables. ED represents the volatility of changes in 
profitability within the industry that the focal firm is operating (Keats & Hitt, 1988). 
Following the work of Keats and Hitt (1988), I calculate the industry level ED through 
two steps. I first regress the industry profit growth rate with year serving as independent 
variables. Then I divide the standard error of the coefficient by the profit industry means 
as the measurement of environmental dynamism (Chen et al., 2017). The large the value, 
the higher the ED. 
 
Environmental munificence (EM) measures the annual growth rate of profit/sales in 
focal firms’ industry (Keats & Hitt, 1988). I employ the same method used for 
constructing ED above. EM is measured as the regression coefficients weighted by 
profit industry mean that capture the growth rate of profits (Chen et al., 2017). The large 
the value, the higher the EM. 
 
Control variables 
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In this chapter, I control for a series of variables that contribute to firm performance. 
First, at the firm level, firm characteristics are introduced. I control for firm size (Size), 
which is measured as the number of employees. Firm size may affect performance 
through economies of scope and scale. Firm age (age) is deducting the current 
observation year from the year in which the firm was first listed on the stock market. 
Firms of different ages may have different cost structures, which may affect their 
performance. Second, I control for several corporate governance variables; these 
variables may affect firm performance through mitigating the agency problems. At the 
firm level, the quality of corporate governance has been found to be effective in 
predicting firms’ performance, and independent directors are believed to be an 
important mechanism in constraining large shareholders’ control and ensuring 
independent and effective firm decisions (Higgs, 2003). I thus measure the independent 
directors (Independent director) as a fraction of the overall number of directors. Board 
size (Board size) denotes the availability of firms’ access to resources and their ability 
to reduce uncertainty in the environment. With more people on the board, including 
non-executives, firms can obtain access to different resources through informal links, 
and this may affect their performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). I use the total number 
of board members to measure this variable.   
 
Finally, to control for the time effect due to policy influence or other unobserved 
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variances associated with time in China’s rapid transition process, I introduce year 
dummies for the period 2003 to 2014, with 2003 omitted as the reference year. To avoid 
a potential endogenous problem caused by correlations among the independent 
variables, I set the values for all of the control variables with a one-year lag (except for 
the dummy variables). 
4.4 Results 
Table 4-1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations of all of the hypothesised 
and control variables. I examined the potential multicollinearity by both inspecting the 
value of the correlation coefficients among the independent variables and computing 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs). All of the correlation coefficients are below the 
0.65 threshold. This suggests that the estimations are unlikely to be biased by 
multicollinearity issues (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). I further checked for potential 
multicollinearity by inspecting both the value of the correlation coefficients among the 
independent variables and computing the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). All of the 
values are within an acceptable range, with a mean VIF value of 1.18 (Kleinbaum, 
Kupper, Nizam, & Muller, 2007). 
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Table 4- 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations4 
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Tobin’s Q 1.91  1.13  1        
2 TD conformity 0.39  0.40  0.08 1       
3 Firm age 11.98  4.95  −0.22  −0.02  1       
4 Independent director 0.37  0.05  0.02  0.00  −0.04  1      
5 Board size 8.94  1.74  −0.16  0.00  0.06  −0.36  1     
6 Firm size 21.64  1.10  −0.46  −0.01  0.20  0.04  0.31  1    
7 leverage 0.38  0.22  −0.44  −0.03  0.19  −0.03  0.19  0.45  1   
8 ED 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.31  −0.08  0.02  0.09  0.14  0.08  1  
9 EM 0.08  0.02  −0.18  0.11  0.07  0.05  0.09  0.24  0.22  0.36  






                                                   
4 The definition and equation can be found at appendix C 
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Table 4-2 shows the results of the regression models. Model 1 is the base model, which 
includes all of the control variables. Models 2 to 4 separately test the main effect of 
technological diversification conformity, the moderating effect of environmental 
munificence, and the moderating effect of environmental dynamism, respectively. The 
values of the 
2  statistics are all significant at the 1% level, suggesting that all of the 
models are significant. The control variables in Model 1 indicate that these variables 
are crucial for improving firms’ performance. 
 
Hypothesis 4.1 predicts that firms’ conformity in regard to technological diversification 
enhances firm performance. In model 2, the coefficient of TD conformity is positive 
and significant . Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported.   
 
Hypothesis 4.2 predicts that the above conformity-performance relationship in regard 
to technological diversification is positively moderated by environmental dynamism. 
Model 3 indicates that the coefficient of TD conformity is positive and significant 
, while the interaction term is positive 
and significant in model 3 ( 10.63, 0.05b p=  ). These results are further confirmed 
in Figure 4-2. The figure shows that the degree of firms’ conformity in regard to 
technological diversification increases with environmental dynamism. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4.2 is supported, indicating that there is a positive moderating effect of 




Hypothesis 4.3 predicts that the relationship between TD conformity and performance 
is negatively moderated by environmental munificence. In model 4, the effect of 
technological diversification conformity is still positive and significant, indicating that 
the finding of Hypothesis 1 is robust. The interaction term in 
model 4 is negative and significant ( 4.30, 0.05b p= −  ). Figure 4-3 elaborates the 
moderating effect of environmental munificence. The effect decreases with 
environmental munificence, indicating a negative moderating role. Thus, Hypothesis 
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Figure 4- 2 Moderating effect of environmental dynamism 
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Figure 4- 3  Moderating effect of environmental munificence 
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Table 4- 2 Estimation of the effects of technological diversification conformity and moderating effects 
of environmental munificence and dynamism 
DV: Tobin’s Q Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Controls     
Independent director 0.32** 0.47** 0.43** 0.39** 
 (1.97) (2.15) (2.23) (2.01) 
Board size 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.13) 
Firm size -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (-24.83) (-10.42) (-9.75) (-9.99) 
Firm age -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (-4.21) (-5.78) (-5.62) (-5.47) 
Leverage -1.02*** -0.33** -0.33*** -0.33** 
 (-10.92) (-2.43) (-2.58) (-2.07) 
ED 7.21*** 5.91*** -0.95 4.89** 
 (9.07) (3.21) (-0.33) (2.02) 
EM -4.09*** -3.82*** -2.50*** -2.53** 
 (-4.20) (-4.14) (-2.79) (-2.17) 
Predictors     
TD conformity  0.39*** 0.31*** 0.66*** 
  (13.32) (6.82) (5.03) 
TD conformityED   10.63**  
   (2.33)  
TD conformityEM    -4.30** 
    (-2.04) 
Constant 3.21*** 2.51*** 2.32*** 2.30*** 
 (5.33) (21.94) (20.62) (18.10) 
2  p   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported, with t statistics in parentheses; DV: Dependent variable; 
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the impact of organisational conformity in regard to 
technological diversification on performance. I further explored the role of industrial 
environments in moderating the relationship between conformity and the consequential 
firm performance. Although some early research explored the broad performance 
implications of technology diversification, we still know relatively little about how 
firms’ conformity to strategic norms in regard to technological diversification patterns 
exerts an impact on performance. The source of firms’ competitiveness in the discussion 
here is different from technological competence stemmed from resources or capability 
based on the resource-based view. Recent review studies have also suggested that there 
is a need to further examine firms’ non-market strategies, such as conformity (Bascle, 
2016). 
 
To contribute to the understanding of firms’ strategic behaviour in regard to conformity, 
this study first explores the process of firms’ technological diversification. The 
institutionalists contend that firms’ behaviours are largely driven by the external 
institutional environment, which can impose cognitive, normative and political 
influences and affect how firms acquire external resources (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & 
Lorente, 2010). Organisational isomorphism, thus, can have an impact on firm 
performance (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Technological diversification is thus 
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unlikely to be entirely determined by firms’ resources and capabilities. It can reflect 
firms’ strategic decisions regarding the scope of their resource commitments 
(Deephouse, 1996). I suggest that the extent of diversification that firms choose will 
have performance implications. By aligning with the strategic norms and adopting the 
institutionalised organisational structure, I argue that firms can legitimate their actions 
in relation to diversification and enhance stakeholder acceptance and participation. This 
increases firms’ external resource exchange, thereby resulting in performance benefits 
(Suchman, 1995). The findings also empirically elucidate that firms can benefit from 
diversifying their technology portfolio that is similar to the industry median. This  
echoes previous research in different contexts. For example, Miller et al. (2013) studied 
Fortune 1000 firms and found that strategic conformity in terms of production or 
operations strategy, product research and development, marketing, financial strategy, 
reinvestment policy and risk orientation is positively related to a return on assets, and 
Dacin et al. (2007) found that firms gain financial benefits through forming alliances 
and being similar to their industry peers. 
 
Secondly, this study complements the existing literature by delineating the boundary 
conditions of conformity theory. I establish that environmental conditions play an 
important role in the link between firms’ strategic conformity in regard to technological 
diversification and performance. In particular, the results enable us to comprehend the 
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environmental conditions under which firms generate competitive advantage by 
resembling their peers in the industry. In a highly dynamic environment where 
industries change rapidly, strategic conformity in regard to technological diversification 
enhances firm performance. This suggests that firms are better off aligning with the 
industrial norms to mitigate uncertainty and legitimate their diversification strategies as 
unpredictable changes in structures, lifecycles and consumer tastes. While in a resource 
munificent environment, firms with high conformity to the technological diversification 
pattern in the industry perform poorly. This result suggests that the positive 
performance benefits brought by strategic conformity are weakened by potential 
external expansion opportunities. Although firms are less constrained in terms of 
pursuing new technological paths, they face increasingly intensified competition as new 
entrants make inroads in the growing market. Overall, this study reduces the 
ambiguities regarding boundary conditions in conformity theory.  
 
In terms of managerial implications, the most common business approach is to use the 
industrial median as a benchmark for business decision making (Miller et al., 2013). 
This finding suggests that managers can benefit from being strategically similar to the 
industry norms. Strategic conformity can be a source of competitive advantage; it may 
increase firms’ chances of success. It may also help firms legitimate their strategic 
actions, especially in regard to pursuing long-term investments or developing 
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capabilities in risky and newer technological areas that are not fully supported by all of 
the stakeholders (Dacin, 1997). However, managers need to be aware that the extent of 
such performance benefits derived from conformity in regard to technological 
diversification is subject to the dynamism and munificence of the industrial 
environment. Both could alter the fabric of an industry. Firms benefit more from 
conformity in an uncertain environment while they gain fewer advantages in a resource 
abundant environment. These results provide valuable insights and serve as general 
guidance for firms in terms of adjusting the degree of their conformity in different 
environments. 
 
This chapter is not without limitations, and future research could further explore and 
extend this line of inquiry. First, although this study empirically tests the relationship 
between conformity in regard to technological diversification and performance in 
different environmental settings, recent literature, such as the study by Zuckerman 
(2016), suggests that there is a need for firms to strike a balance between conformity 
and differentiation in order to achieve optimal distinctiveness. I have not considered 
this ‘strategic balance perspective’ in this chapter (Wæraas & Sataøen, 2015; Zhao et 
al., 2017). This chapter focuses, however, on providing further evidence to explain the 
benefits of strategic conformity in regard to technological diversification. Future 
research might want to expand this line of inquiry and take into account this theoretical 
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constraint. Secondly, this research is also limited by the availability of finer-grained 
data to reveal how the different types of diversification, namely related and unrelated 
diversification, affect firm performance. This is mainly because the IPC data does not 
contain any information, like four digit and two-digit SIC codes, to operationalise 
related and unrelated diversification (Sambharya, 2000). This study is limited by the 
data in terms of constructing measurements. Future studies could explore this promising 
research area. Thirdly, it is possible that some other environmental factors, such as 
organisational culture, market infrastructure, and the public relationship, might affect 
the conformity-performance relationship I have identified here. Future research could 
build on this study to further explore other contingency factors. Fourthly, this research 
is based on the single country empirical context of China and also a sample of Chinese 
listed firms. The replication of this study in a cross-country context or with a large 
sample could be a promising way to generalise the conclusions. Although this study is 
constrained by the limited data and methodology, it provides some useful insights into 
the way in which firms should approach technological diversification by considering 
the industrial and environmental contexts. Last but not least, in this paper, I consider 
the roles of dominate institution that make firms to imitate their peers and comply. 
However, recent theoretical advance also emphasised that there are multiple logics at 
work (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Though I do not consider this situation in this chapter, 
I would like to suggest that firms are embedded into multiple demands from different 
Chapter 4 Technological diversification and firm performance-An institutional view 
112 
stakeholders. However, this premise is not excluded from the roles of the dominant 
institution. In fact, though different logics work at the same time, the relative power of 
each institution is different. Thus, there may still one dominate institution that guide 
firms strategies (Lounsbury & Boxenbaum, 2013). Other institutions, on the other hand, 
may force firms to comply in a symbolic way, leaving it rather decoupled (Greenwood 
et al., 2011). I encourage future research to revisit this finding from the institutional 
logics view. 
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Chapter 5 Technological diversification and firm performance-An 
optimal distinctiveness view 
5.1 Introduction 
Scholars and practitioners are paying more attention to technological strategies because 
firms are suffering as a result of the increasing complexity of technology, the shortening 
of product cycles, and the fast-changing innovation environment (Wang et al., 2014). 
Among these strategies, technological diversification is a core interest for researchers 
of organisation and innovation (Bou-Wen, Chung-Jen, & Hsueh-Liang, 2006; Leten et 
al., 2007). Technological diversification has been seen as a way for firms to achieve 
economies of scope by sharing and recombining heterogeneous resources or 
capabilities, spreading innovation-related investment risks over several technological 
fields, and accessing multiple markets to increase overall yield (Ramaswamy, 
Purkayastha, & Petitt, 2017). Yet, research has tended to focus on strategic perspectives 
that emphasise that differentiation in terms of technological diversification can generate 
superior performance (Miller, 2006), rather than on the institutional perspective that 
conformity in regard to technological diversification patterns can confer legitimacy. 
This chapter offers a finer-grained view of technological strategy by arguing that firms 
should balance the differentiation and the conformity views of technological 
diversification to achieve better performance. 
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The existing research on technological diversification offers an incomplete view as it 
focused on differentiation through technological diversification. Such studies view 
technological diversification as a way for firms to differentiate themselves from their 
competitors, providing them with unexplored niches from which to profit. For example, 
Leten et al. (2007) view technological diversification as a means to reduce the 
transaction costs of purchasing technologies from the market. They believe that this 
strategy enables firms to outperform their competitors because firms with diversified 
portfolios are distinct and rare, and it is hard for competitors to imitate them (Miller, 
2006). 
 
However, these studies essentially focus on the strategic perspective of technological 
diversification – that distinctiveness can increase profits – and overlook the fact that it 
can be understood from an institutional perspective as conformity to industry receipt 
(Deephouse, 1999; Miller et al., 2013; Oliver, 1991). Understanding and combining 
these two perspectives of technological diversification can help us to better explain how 
and under what conditions a technological diversification strategy may benefit firms. It 
may also help to explain the inconclusive findings regarding how technological 
diversification impacts on firm performance. 
 
Building on the strategic balance viewpoint (Deephouse, 1999; Zuckerman, 2016), I 
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argue that firms should strike a balance between differentiation and conformity in 
regard to technological diversification, which can generate abnormal rents for them. A 
singular focus on either differentiation or conformity could be detrimental to firms’ 
performance. In other words, moderate technological diversification conformity can 
contribute to firm performance, while low or high conformity does not. A high level of 
technological diversification conformity will result in a firm facing severe competition 
and generating low rents, while a low level of technological diversification conformity 
will result in firm suffering from legitimacy challenges that will compromise its 
performance (Deephouse, 1999). This view can explain why previous studies on 
technological diversification have not reached a consensus on the technological 
diversification-performance relationship. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 2003 
to 2014, this chapter empirically tests the aforementioned hypothesis. Moreover, I also 
investigate how the impact of moderate technological diversification may vary with 
differing firm characteristics, namely firm age and ownership. 
 
This chapter seeks to make two contributions. First, it advances the research on 
technological diversification by combining the differentiation and conformity 
perspectives of technological diversification. It offers a finer-grained framework that 
can explain the so-far inconclusive findings on the relationship between technological 
diversification and firm performance. Second, it explores the boundary conditions of 
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how strategic balance may affect firm performance. Although strategic balance may 
contribute to firm performance, this relationship can be affected by organisational 
characteristics (Durand & Kremp, 2016). However, so far, no studies have attempted to 
investigate the boundary conditions of technological diversification conformity. This 
chapter tries to fill this gap by investigating how the effect of a moderate level of 
technological diversification conformity may change in different firm settings. 
5.2 Theory and hypothesis 
A strategic balance perspective of technological diversification 
Firms are not just rational entities that voluntarily pursue economic goals; they are also 
embedded in a larger institutional context that is socially constructed (Westphal & Zajac, 
2013; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). On the one hand, firms can be understood from the 
strategic view, which emphasises how self-interested firms strategically choose a 
response to differentiate their offerings from their peers in order to achieve better 
performance (Vracheva, Judge, & Madden, 2016). On the other hand, firms also need 
to adhere to industry-accepted rules in order to gain legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 
2008; Suchman, 1995). For example, if their strategic positioning is incongruent with 
the prevailing institutions, firms will suffer from legitimacy challenges and 
performance losses (Deephouse, Bundy, Tost, & Suchman, 2017). Thus, firms’ 
strategies are influenced by both strategic and institutional forces. This study takes this 
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perspective by developing a strategic balance framework of technological 
diversification as an organisational response to both strategic and institutional demands. 
Strategic view of technological diversification 
The strategic view holds that firms with unique strategies face less competition, and 
can thus improve their performance (Pisano, 2017). This differentiation results from 
firms either maintaining a favourable position in their industry (Porter, 1980) or having 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resources, which confer on them a 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). In a perfect competition market, the economic 
rents equal zero, and firms enjoy less competition, or even a local monopoly when they 
find unexplored niches. The rents from this differentiation strategy depend on the speed 
with which competitors can imitate and successfully implement the same strategy, and 
the cost of doing so (Rajiv, Raj, & Arindam, 2014). When strategies are hard to imitate 
or expensive to implement, firms will enjoy a first-mover advantage if they exploit the 
benefits of differentiation. By contrast, when the cost of imitation is low, firms have to 
find new niches in order to remain different from their competitors. Otherwise, they 
will have to compete for limited resources in the same environment (Barney, 1991). 
 
In this context, numerous studies have investigated the technological diversification-
firm performance relationship from the strategic view. Technological diversification 
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can be understood as firms developing strategies to find new niches in the market and 
using these strategies to differentiate themselves from their peers, as the main purpose 
of technological diversification is to achieve synergies between different technologies 
(Kim et al., 2016). The new combination of technologies will enable firms to find new 
niches to exploit for profit. For example, Watanabe et al. (2004) have shown that Canon 
actively engages with multiple technologies in order to explore new combinations and 
innovations. Because these new combinations and innovations originate from the firm’s 
unique technology routines, this technological diversification strategy makes imitation 
harder for competitors, thus giving the firm a longer time frame in which to derive 
profits from this strategy. Thus, from a strategic viewpoint, low-level technological 
diversification conformity will facilitate higher rents for firms. 
Institutional view of technological diversification 
Institutional theorists believe that a firm’s strategy should be congruent with most of its 
competitors in order for the firm to gain legitimacy and achieve superior performance 
(Deephouse et al., 2017). In most industries, a firm-specific strategy is not necessary 
(Miller et al., 2013). Moreover, strategy selection involves uncertainty as firms can 
hardly predict customer and future market trends (Schilke, 2014). In such an uncertain 
environment, firms are likely to imitate the industry norm or the strategies of other 
successful firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) to reduce uncertainty. Institutional 
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theorists argue that legitimacy is the key for firms to achieve success, and in turn, the 
key for legitimacy is simply to conform to industry norms (Deephouse & Suchman, 
2008; Suchman, 1995) and take the industry receipt (Spender, 1989). Put simply, 
adopting strategies similar to those of others legitimates firms and increases their 
survival rate. 
 
In this research context, the institutional view can explain how conformity in regard to 
technological diversification patterns will lead to firm performance. Innovating in 
technology, especially in multiple technologies, involves a high degree of uncertainty, 
as firms can guarantee neither the success of the innovation nor that customers will 
accept it in the future. In such circumstances, firms are likely to innovate and diversify 
like the majority of their competitors in the same industry. Zajac and Westphal (2004) 
found that the value of a firm is socially constructed and assessed by investors. Key 
constituents will try to understand a firm’s behaviour and confer legitimacy by 
comparing the focal firm’s strategies with that of their competitors (Zimmerman & 
Zeitz, 2002). If a firm’s strategy is beyond the acceptance range and external 
constituents can hardly understand why the firm is engaging in such a strategy, they 
will label the firm a “misfit and idiosyncratic” (Reger & Huff, 1993). In such cases, 
firms will lose “easy access to resources, unrestricted access to markets and long-term 
survival” (Brown, 1998: 35). In short, firms with a high level of technological 
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diversification conformity will have superior performance. 
A balanced, integrated approach 
While it is theoretically possible that the strategic and institutional views will influence 
the mechanism between technological diversification and firm performance, I believe 
that by taking only one perspective, only a partial explanation of technological 
diversification can be provided. While the strategic view starts from the rational 
perspective that firms intentionally adopt strategies and pursue profits, the institutional 
view begins with a rejection of rationality as an explanation for organisational 
behaviour (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). While firms are organisations with bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1991), both views would appear to have merit. On the one hand, the 
need for legitimacy leads firms to demonstrate their comparability with the standard 
offerings (such as providing technological diversification patterns similar to the 
industry recipe). Offerings that stand outside of the comparison are ignored and seen as 
“so many oranges in a competition among apples” (Zuckerman, 1999: 1401). On the 
other hand, competition drives firms to differentiate their offerings from those of their 
competitors to establish desirability. Zuckerman’s “candidate-audience interface” 
model suggests that firms’ behaviours need to satisfy the need for both differentiation 
and conformity to improve survival rates. Deephouse and subsequent studies have gone 
a step further, arguing that solving the tension between differentiation and conformity 
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is the key to firms’ success. As a result, firms need to behave in a strategic, balanced 
way to improve their performance (Deephouse, 1999; Zhao et al., 2017; Zuckerman, 
2016).  
 
In sum, the integrated view emphasises the complementary nature of the strategic and 
institutional perspectives and that firms should seek optimal distinctiveness to improve 
their performance. Moreover, recent theoretical advances also indicate that the optimal 
level of conformity (distinctiveness) is contingent on a series of internal firm 
characteristics as well as external environmental factors (Askin & Mauskapf, 2017; 
Gehman & Grimes, 2016). Within this strategic balance framework, I will next advance 
and test the hypothesis on the impact of how a strategic balance of technological 
diversification will lead to firm performance and its boundary conditions. 
Hypothesis 
In a market with strong competition and institutional pressure, both differentiation and 
conformity should be important for firms to achieve success. From the strategic balance 
viewpoint, I expect firms with a moderate level of technological diversification 
conformity to have superior performance. When firms reach a high level of 
technological diversification conformity, they will not be affected by legitimacy 
challenges, but they will suffer from severe competition in terms of the number of 
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competitors with the same strategy. In this case, the rents of the strategy will equal zero. 
The cost of severe competition outweighs the benefits of the legitimacy gains resulting 
from conforming to industry receipt. Thus, firms are less likely to benefit when 
conformity is high. 
 
On the other hand, when firms choose a completely different strategy from those of 
their competitors, they still benefit very little from this differentiation. Although 
differentiation can provide firms with new niches, or even a monopoly position, such  
strategies cannot be understood by investors and other stakeholders. In this case, firms 
will suffer from legitimacy challenges when external constituents are reluctant to 
exchange resources with them. Firms are thus constrained if resources are expensive or 
have limited availability in the market (Deephouse, 1999). In this situation, the benefits 
of differentiation cannot compensate for the costs of losing legitimacy, and thus firms 
are less likely to benefit when strategic conformity is low. 
 
I argue that firms will profit when their strategic conformity is moderate. This is also 
the case in relation to technological diversification. When a firm diversifies in ways that 
are completely unlike the approaches of its competitors (i.e. conformity is low), 
investors and customers can hardly understand or approve of the strategy and therefore 
are less likely to invest in or purchase products from the firm. When a firm achieves 
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moderate technological diversification conformity, it will enjoy the positive sides of 
both differentiation and conformity while suffering less than it would have from 
concentrating too much on either side. On the one hand, firms with moderate 
technological diversification conformity face reduced competition, which enables them 
to differentiate themselves from their competitors. On the other hand, such firms’ 
technological diversification strategies do not fall beyond the acceptance range, which 
prevents them from being challenged by external constituents (Deephouse, 1999). By 
contrast, when technological diversification conformity is high, firms will face severe 
competition as their competitors are also providing the same technological products to 
customers. In a perfect market, customers will choose products randomly, making firms 
less likely to profit from being isomorphic. In conclusion, I expect that firms with 
moderate technological diversification conformity will have superior performance. 
Hence: 
 
H5.1: Technological diversification conformity exhibits a curvilinear (inverse U-
shaped) relationship with firm performance. (There is a trade-off between the 
mechanical view and the institutional view of technological diversification) 
Moderating effects of firm age and ownership 
The above hypothesis is based on the idea that firms continuously interact with the 
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external environment to adjust their optimal level of technological diversification 
conformity. I argue that this adjustment depends on characteristics such as firm age 
(Oliver, 1997) and ownership (Li & Zhang, 2007). In this study, I also focus on the 
moderating effects of these two factors in relation to the impact of technological 
diversification conformity on firm performance. 
 
In China, firms are significantly different depending on their ownership. It has been 
found that the relationship between the resource and market positions of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) are asymmetric in China. 
SOEs have been characterised as actors who “naturally have legitimacy and receive 
support or even protection from the government agencies that have founded them” (Li 
and Zhang, 2007: 794). Thus, the legitimacy stock of SOEs is more abundant than that 
of NSOEs. Compared with NSOEs, SOEs can bear more legitimacy changes. For 
example, Sherer and Lee (2002) investigated human resource management conformity 
in law firms and found that highly prestigious offices can be non-conformist, as they 
have more legitimacy stock available and are less sensitive to legitimacy changes. 
 
In the case of technological diversification conformity, I predict that state ownership 
will negatively moderate the relationship between technological conformity and firm 
performance. On the one hand, NSOEs lack a stable legitimacy status and endorsements 
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from local government while enjoying lower agency costs, more effective 
administration processes, and a fast response to market change (Zhou, Gao, & Zhao, 
2017), and thus the value of these firms is increased more quickly when they are 
legitimated through technological diversification conformity. SOEs, by contrast, are 
less likely to benefit from this increase in legitimacy, as they are already endorsed by 
local government and have an abundant legitimacy stock; thus, their legitimacy status 
is stable and not a concern in relation to their performance. On the other hand, the 
damage arising from over-conformity is also greater for NSOEs. In this case, firms’ 
technological diversification patterns are similar to those of their competitors in the 
same industry; firms are thus constrained by a lack of distinctiveness rather than a lack 
of legitimacy. SOEs can get access to other important resources from local governments 
and agencies, as governments are large shareholders, which means that SOEs too big 
to fail (Peng, 2003). This makes the impact of over-conformity in terms of decreased 
performance less severe for SOEs than it is for NSOEs. Hence: 
 
H5.2: State ownership negatively moderates the relationship between technological 
diversification conformity and firm performance, such that the curvilinear relationship 
between technological diversification conformity and firm performance is more 
pronounced (i.e., steeper) when firms are non-state-owned. 
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Firm age can also change the relationship between technological diversification 
conformity and firm performance. I predict that firm age will have a positive 
moderating role in the relationship between technological diversification conformity 
and firm performance. On the one hand, older firms with more ready-to-use resources 
at hand (such as trained employees, equipment, and informal personal ties) can more 
quickly and easily take advantage of increasing legitimacy to increase their value. Older 
firms will leverage their abundant ready-to-use resources and the image of legitimacy 
to attract new customers or find new niches in which to sell their products. By contrast, 
younger firms are less likely to benefit from the legitimacy increase from conformity 
as they are weaker in terms of absorptive capacity and production abilities, making it 
harder for them to use the image of legitimacy to attract customers. They are constrained 
by a lack of both credibility and the qualifications needed to provide products and 
services, in comparison to older firms (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Thus, increased 
legitimacy is less likely to solve all of their problems. 
 
On the other hand, the damage arising from over-conformity is also greater for older 
firms. In this context, the advantages for older firms vanish and such firms are more 
likely to be constrained by path-dependent routines. Older firms are less likely to 
outperform younger firms because younger firms can be legitimated through adopting 
similar technological diversification strategies, while also enjoying a competitive 
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advantage in terms of having fewer sunk costs, a more effective administrative structure, 
and the ability to change their strategies at a faster rate. When technological 
diversification conformity is high, the routinised production procedures of older firms 
become a burden to these firms, whereas younger firms can more easily switch to 
different combinations of assets to meet the need for multiple technologies (Chiu et al., 
2008). Hence: 
 
H5.3: Firm age positively moderates the relationship between technological 
diversification conformity and firm performance, such that the curvilinear relationship 
between technological diversification conformity and firm performance is more 
pronounced (i.e., steeper) when firms are older. 
 
Figure 5-1 conceptually illustrates the rationale behind this study, which aims to utilise 
the strategic balance framework in technological diversification research to capture the 
nature of technological diversification in a more comprehensive way. I also extend the 
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Figure 5- 1 Theoretical framework 
 
5.3 Data and Method 
The sample used in this study comprises the firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges from 2003 to 2014. The sample was constructed from two independent 
sources: The China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and the 
State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China (SIPO). SIPO is 
the world’s largest patent office in terms of patent applications, having overtaken the 
Japanese Patent Office (JPO) in 2011 and the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) in 2012 (WIPO, 2012). SIPO records information for each patent, 
including the International Patent Classification (IPC), which is used to calculate 
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technological diversification conformity. CSMAR is one of the largest databases of 
Chinese publicly listed firms and a primary source of information on Chinese stock 
markets and the financial statements of China’s listed firms, and has been adopted in 
various research settings, including in relation to corporate takeovers (Li & Qian, 2013) 




Dependent variable: There are many measurements of firms’ performance, and they 
can be mainly grouped into two types: accounting measures and market measures. 
Accounting measures include Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and 
Return on Sales (ROS). There are three main arguments against accounting-based 
measurements of firm performance. First, they are simply the reflection of past 
performance and are not forward-looking; second, they are not adjusted for risk; and 
finally, they will be distorted by temporary disequilibrium effects, tax laws, and 
accounting conventions (Bharadwaj et al., 1999). 
 
Scholars in organisational learning have argued that a company’s technological 
trajectory can be characterised as path-dependent and will affect the firm’s performance 
in the long run (Fai, 2003). In terms of technological diversification, I suggested that it 
may take years before firms can get the profit from this strategy. As a result, a forward-
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looking measurement of firms’ performance rather than backwards-looking metrics 
such as ROA is needed to study the relationship between technological diversification 
and firm performance. 
 
 
Instead of using accounting-based measurements, scholars in innovation research have 
adopted market-based measurements to better capture firms’ performance. Tobin's Q 
has been suggested to use in the literature by indicating its advantage in capturing firms’ 
short-term performance as well as long-term performance (Jayachandran et al., 2013). 
As this performance measurement is forward-looking, risk-adjusted, and less 
susceptible to changes in accounting practices (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988), 
providing a simple metric to operationalise both short- and long-term performance 
effects using a single performance variable (Kor & Mahoney, 2005). In a simulation 
study, Sauaia and Castro (2002) found that that company with a high performance 
exhibited a higher value for Tobin’s Q than those with a poor performance. In addition, 
Tobin's Q demonstrates aspects of the companies' future tendencies that may better fit 
the situation of this study. Thus, I use Tobin’s Q as the proxy of firm performance, which 
is defined as the market value of assets divided by the total assets of the firm. The 





=                                             (equation 5-1) 
 
 
Where MV is the market value of firms. It is calculated as: 
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(Total shares -B Share) ×Closing price of A share + B Share × Closing price ×Exchange 
Rate. TA is the total assets disclosed in the balance sheet. 
 
Independent variable: The independent variable in this paper is technological 
diversification conformity (TD conformity). I construct this variable by measuring the 
proximity in technological portfolio between the focal firm and the industry median 
(Deephouse, 1999; Miller et al., 2013). Following the work of Jaffe (1986), I first 
calculate the focal firm’s technology portfolio by counting the distribution of firms’ 
patents in different technology classifications, and then compute the industry average. 
I then calculate the uncentred correlation of the patent distribution vectors of the focal 
firm and the industry median across different technological classifications as follows: 
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=                                     (equation 5-2) 
 
Where 1( , , )i i ijF N N=  represents the technological portfolio of the thi  firm, and 
ijN   is the total number of patents that the thi   firm holds in the technological 
classification j  ( (1,2, ,8)j =  defined by the patent office; m  denotes the industry 
average. The value of the proximity varies between 0 and 1. When the technological 
vectors of the firm and the industry average overlap, the value equals 1. When the 
vectors are orthogonal, the value is 0. 
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Moderating variables: Two moderating variables are included in this paper. Following 
previous research (Wang, Wong, & Xia, 2008), I measure State ownership as a dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 if the firm is owned by the Chinese government and its 
agencies, and 0 if it is owned by private or other kinds of shareholders. Firm age (age) 
is calculated by deducting the current observation year from the year in which the firm 
was first listed on the stock market. 
 
Control variables: I control for a number of factors that might affect firm performance. 
At the firm level, the quality of corporate governance has been found to be effective in 
predicting firms’ performance, and independent directors are believed to be an 
important mechanism in constraining large shareholders’ control and ensuring 
independent and effective firm decisions (Higgs, 2003). I thus measure the independent 
directors (Independent director) as a fraction of the overall number of directors. Board 
size (Board size) denotes the availability of firms’ access to resources and their ability 
to reduce uncertainty in the environment. With more people on the board, including 
non-executives, firms can obtain access to different resources through informal links, 
and this may affect their performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). I use the total number 
of board members to measure this variable. I also include firm size (Firm size), which 
is measured by the natural log of the total assets. Leverage (Leverage) has been found 
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to affect firm performance and is defined as total debt divided by the total assets To 
control for the time effect of policy influence or other unobserved variances associated 
with time in China’s rapid transition process, I introduce year dummies for the period 
2003 to 2014. 
 
At the industry level, the external environment affects firm performance through firms’ 
risk sensing and strategy selection. Therefore, this study uses environmental 
munificence (EM) and environmental dynamism (ED) as control variables that have 
been found to affect firm performance (Chiu et al., 2008). Following the work of Dess 
and Beard (1984), I calculate the industry-level ED in two steps. I first regress the 
industry profit growth rate, with the year serving as the independent variable. Then I 
divide the standard error of the coefficient by the profit industry mean as the 
measurement of environmental dynamism (Chen et al., 2017). The larger the value, the 
higher the ED. Environmental munificence measures the annual growth rate of 
profit/sales in the focal firm’s industry. I employ the same method used to construct ED 
above. EM is measured as the regression coefficient weighted by the profit industry 
mean, which captures the growth rate of profits (Chen et al., 2017). The larger the value, 
the higher the EM. 
Methods 
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In order to reflect the result of the last two chapters, I use two different and 
interconnected approaches to examine the hypothesis. Specifically, I first multiply 
technological diversification, which includes the explorative and exploitative 




 iFirm performance technological diversification







If 1  is found to be negative and significant, I can confirm that there is a trade-off 
between strategic differentiation and conformity. Thus, Hypothesis 6.1 is supported. 
 
Alternatively, I square technological diversification conformity; if an inverse U shaped 
relationship between technological diversification conformity and firm performance is 
observed, we can also confirm the trade-off between the mechanical and institutional 
views of technological diversification.  
 
5.4 Results 
Table 5-1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for each variable in this study. 
All of the correlation coefficients are below the 0.65 threshold. This suggests that the 
estimations are unlikely to be biased by multicollinearity issues (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
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2012). I also find that Tobin’s Q is positively related to TD conformity, which provides 
preliminary evidence of a relationship between TD conformity and firm performance.
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Table 5- 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations5 
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Tobin’s Q 1.91  1.13  1         
2 TD conformity 0.39  0.40  0.08 1        
3 Firm age 11.98  4.95  −0.22  −0.02  1        
4 State ownership 0.39  0.49  −0.27  0.02  0.23  1       
5 Independent director 0.37  0.05  0.02  0.00  −0.04  −0.07  1      
6 Board size 8.94  1.74  −0.16  0.00  0.06  0.30  −0.36  1     
7 Firm size 21.64  1.10  −0.46  −0.01  0.20  0.41  0.04  0.31  1    
8 leverage 0.38  0.22  −0.44  −0.03  0.19  0.38  −0.03  0.19  0.45  1   
9 ED 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.31  −0.08  0.13  0.02  0.09  0.14  0.08  1  
10 EM 0.08  0.02  −0.18  0.11  0.07  0.13  0.05  0.09  0.24  0.22  0.36  
Notes: Correlations > 0.03 in magnitudes are statistically significant at 0.1 level or higher; sample year from 2003 to 2014 
 
                                                   
5 The equation and definition of each variable can be found on appendix D 
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Tests of hypotheses 1 and 3 
Table 5-2 reports the regression model used to test the relationship between TD 
conformity and firm performance and the moderating effect of firm age. All three 
models are statistically significant. Model 1 is a baseline model that includes only the 
control variables. It suggests that independent directors, firm size, firm leverage, list 
exchanges, and environmental dynamism and munificence are related to firm 
performance. However, I do not find evidence that board size contributes to firm 
performance.  
 
Hypothesis 5.1 predicted that there is a trade-off between the mechanical and 
institutional views of technological diversification. As discussed earlier, I provide two 
alternatives to measure this trade-off. Model 2(a) in Table 5-2 supports H1 with 
  for TD conformity and  for TD 
conformity square. In Model 3, the coefficients of TD conformity and TD conformity 
square are also significantly positive and negative respectively, providing a robust result. 
Moreover, in Model 2(b), the interaction between technological diversification and 
technological diversification conformity is negative and significant. 
 
Hypothesis 5.3 predicted that firm age positively moderates the relationship between 
TD conformity and firm performance. The regression coefficient of the interaction 
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terms between TD conformity and firm age is positive and significant 
 , and that of the interaction terms between TD conformity 
square and firm age is negative and significant . Thus, H5.3 is 
supported. 
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Table 5- 2 Results of regression analysis from the whole sample 
DV: Tobin’s Q Model 1  Model 2a  Model 2b Model 3  
Controls     
Independent director 0.49** 0.51** 0.52** 0.42* 
 (2.07) (2.15) (2.23) (1.81) 
Board size 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 (0.20) (0.27) (0.20) (0.03) 
Firm size −0.32*** −0.32*** −0.331*** −0.31*** 
 (−24.83) (−24.83) (−26.15) (−24.06) 
Leverage −1.41*** −1.40*** −1.48*** −1.36*** 
 (−23.64) (−23.55) (−19.55) (−22.86) 
ED 19.00*** 13.48*** 10.23*** 11.52*** 
 (10.02) (6.71) (4.23) (5.70) 
EM −5.60*** −5.08*** −5.31*** −4.80*** 
 (−6.96) (−6.32) (−5.32) (−5.98) 
Predictors     
Firm age    −0.01*** 
    (−5.95) 
TD conformity TD   -0.23** 
(-2.09) 
 
     
TD conformity  0.99***  0.68*** 
  (8.44)  (3.50) 
(TD conformity)2  −0.93***  −0.57** 
  (−7.49)  (−2.57) 
TD conformity Firm age    0.01** 
    (2.05) 
(TD conformity)2 Firm age    −0.02* 
    (−1.84) 
Constant 9.45*** 9.32*** 7.32*** 9.42*** 
 (34.35) (33.99) (23.99) (34.35) 
2  p   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01; dummies were included but not 
reported. 
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Tests of hypothesis 2 
In order to test the moderating effect of state ownership and following previous research 
(Gao, Shu, Jiang, Gao, & Page, 2017), I adopt subsample regression. There are two 
reasons for this. First, SOEs and NSOEs are different in nature, not in degree (Li & 
Zhang, 2007). Second, Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2002) suggest that subgroup 
regression is superior for testing the differences between regression coefficients in 
distinct groups, especially when the relationship is curvilinear. I then split the sample 
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Table 5- 3 Results of regression analysis from the two subsamples 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
NSOEs  SOEs  
Bootstrap test 
Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 
Controls      
Independent director 0.38 0.39 0.54 0.57  
 (1.15) (1.20) (1.51) (1.59)  
Board size 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005  
 (0.36) (0.46) (0.50) (0.51)  
Firm size −0.32*** −0.32*** −0.30*** −0.30***  
 (−14.80) (−14.76) (−18.29) (−18.30)  
Leverage −1.44*** −1.42*** −1.33*** −1.32***  
 (−17.40) (−17.29) (−14.64) (−14.61)  
ED 25.03*** 17.57*** 12.54*** 8.99***  
 (8.95) (5.92) (4.83) (3.27)  
EM −4.33*** −3.30*** −6.71** −6.47***  
 (−3.38) (−2.58) (−6.57) (−6.31)  
Predictors      
TD conformity  1.14***  0.77*** 0.369*** 
  (7.37)  (4.29)  
(TD conformity)2  −1.07***  −0.74*** −0.323** 
  (−6.48)  (−3.90)  
Constant 9.38*** 9.17*** 9.12*** 9.05***  
 (19.17) (18.85) (26.54) (26.33)  
2  p  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 




The results of the subgroup analysis shown in Table 5-3 were used to test H2. First, in 
NSOEs, the relationship between technological diversification conformity and firm 
performance is inverse U-shaped,  for TD conformity and 
 for TD conformity square. The relationship between 
technological diversification conformity and firm performance is also inverse U-shaped 
for SOEs, for TD conformity and for 
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TD conformity square. In order to test the differences in the corresponding regression 
coefficients in the two distinct subsamples, I adopt bootstrap test with 500 times 
resample. The results support H2 because the squared terms of TD conformity are 
significantly different for SOEs and NSOEs (p < 0.05). 
 
The moderating results are illustrated graphically in Figures 5-2 and Figure 5-3. I find 
that the curve for NSOEs is steeper, indicating a negative moderating role of state 
ownership (Figure 5-2). Additionally, the curve for older firms is steeper, indicating a 
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Figure 5- 2 Moderation effect of state ownership 
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5.5 Discussions 
Previous research on technological diversification is mostly based on the strategic view 
that perceives technological diversification as a strategy that helps firms to stand out 
from their competitors. However, recent theoretical advances in strategic balance argue 
that technological diversification can also be understood in terms of firms’ conformity 
to industry norms, and that a balance between differentiation and conformity is the key 
to firms’ success (Deephouse, 1999; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Drawing on the 
strategic view of technological diversification, this study focuses on how technological 
diversification conformity is related to firm performance in a non-linear way. I also 
investigate how this relationship may be altered depending on firms’ characteristics in 
terms of state ownership and firm age. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study to investigate, from a strategic balance perspective, how technological 
diversification affects firm performance. 
Theoretical implications  
This study makes several contributions to theory. It adds to the literature by offering a 
new perspective from which to understand technological diversification. Previous 
findings on technological diversification and firm performance are inconclusive. Most 
work has started from a strategic viewpoint to investigate how technological 
diversification affects firm performance. That is, such research takes technological 
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diversification as a strategy by which firms differentiate themselves from their 
competitors, and studies whether a higher (or lower) level of technological 
diversification can contribute to firm performance. This strategic perspective, however, 
overlooks the fact that firms’ strategy can also be a response to institutional pressure to 
acquire legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2008). This paper advances the technological 
diversification research by arguing that firms should reach a balance between being 
different to, and the same as, other firms, with the aim of being “as different as 
legitimately possible” (Deephouse, 1999: 147). This strategic, balanced view can 
partially explain how more or less technological diversification contributes to firm 
performance. External constituents should first compare firms with similar actors (i.e. 
categorization) to understand other firms’ strategies (Zuckerman, 2016). Whether more 
or less diversification leads to greater profits also depends on competitors in the same 
industry. As a result, considering technological diversification only in a firm-specific 
way, without considering competitors’ conditions, will hardly capture the mechanism 
through which technological diversification affects firm performance. 
 
This study also found that the curvilinear pattern of technological diversification 
conformity does not remain the same across contexts. The effect of technological 
diversification conformity on firm performance also depends on firm characteristics 
such as firm age and state ownership. While previous studies on strategic balance (e.g. 
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Deephouse (1999) offer us insights into how the balance of differentiation and 
conformity affects firm performance, we still know little about how the optimal 
distinctiveness changes in response to various contingencies (Zhao et al., 2017). This 
paper advances the strategic balance research by identifying two contingencies: firm 
age and state ownership. Apart from knowing that reaching a balance between 
differentiation and conformity can benefit firms, we should also be aware that this 
relationship is not constant across all firms and that it depends on internal characteristics, 
such as firm age and ownership, as discussed in this study, as well as on external 
contingencies, such as public relationship and regional development, which need to be 
further investigated. 
 
This study also adds to the literature by shedding light on technology strategies in 
emerging economies such as China. The advances in strategic balance have been 
theoretically proposed and empirically tested in the context of developed countries, 
where institutional infrastructures are well-established and stable. However, whether 
the findings based in developed regions still hold in developing countries where 
institutions are weak still needs to be investigated. Using a sample of listed Chinese 
firms, this study suggests that firms in developing countries also suffer from the trade-
offs between differentiation and conformity. This study is also relevant in providing 
suggestions for rapid diversification for Chinese firms. These findings have 
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implications for Chinese firms in terms of how they can adopt technological 
diversification strategies to promote greater profit. 
Practical implications  
How to adopt technology strategies in such a way as to increase profit is a concern for 
all firms. I suggest that firms should be as legitimately different as possible. Firms 
should be aware that despite the benefits of strategic conformity, reaching a high level 
of conformity beyond the optimal point does not necessarily contribute to firm 
performance, and may even be detrimental to outcomes. As the findings suggest, 
diminishing returns are observed when firms’ technological diversification conformity 
increases past an optimal point. Managers should continuously monitor the firm’s 
technology patterns and performance. If unanticipated slowed growth or a decline in 
firm performance is observed, managers should try to decrease any trend towards 
greater distinctiveness of the firm’s technology strategies. Moreover, the optimal 
distinctiveness (or isomorphism) will also depend on the firm’s characteristics. The 
results suggest that NSOEs and older firms have a higher optimal level of conformity, 
and these firms’ performance improves faster with greater conformity. However, the 
managers of these firms should also be alert to the fact that performance decline is also 
faster when firms pass the optimal level of distinctiveness. 
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Limitations and future research 
 
This study is not without its limitations and, as a consequence, there are areas for future 
research. First, more boundary conditions should be identified. Although I have 
identified two contingencies, firm age and state ownership, more internal and external 
factors may change the optimal level of distinctiveness, which may have different 
implications for firms’ strategies. More characteristics of firms, such as board diversity, 
personal ties, and political connections, should be included in the future. Contingencies 
such as customers’ perceptions, public relationship, and institutional development also 
warrant further investigation. Second, this paper investigates technology strategy 
conformity – to be specific, technological diversification – but whether the findings can 
be generalised to other strategies, such as product diversification or corporate social 
engagement, still needs to be studied. Third, this research is also limited by the lack of 
availability of finer-grained data that could reveal how the different types of 
diversification conformity – namely, related and unrelated diversification – affect firm 
performance. This is mainly because the IPC data does not contain any information 
such as four-digit and two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes that 
could operationalise related and unrelated diversification (Sambharya, 2000). Last but 
not least, this research is based on the single-country empirical context of China and a 
sample of Chinese listed firms. The replication of this study in a cross-country context 
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or a larger sample would be a promising way to generalise the conclusions. 
6.6 Conclusions 
Starting from a strategic balance perspective, this study explores how technological 
diversification conformity affects firm performance, and how this relationship depends 
on firms’ characteristics such as firm age and state ownership. My results show that 
technological diversification conformity exhibits a curvilinear (inverse U-shaped) 
relationship with firm performance. This relationship is weaker when firms are state-
owned and when they are younger. This study advances the research through providing 
an alternative explanation of how technological diversification can contribute to firm 
performance. 
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Chapter 6 Closing Remarks 
The previous three chapters address the technological diversification-firm performance 
relationship through three different but interconnected perspectives (i.e. the mechanical 
view, the institutional view and the optimal distinctiveness view). My results provide 
empirical evidence for all three perspectives. Thus, it is time for me to integrate the 
aforementioned three perspectives and also review the recent literature to build a 
framework that can suggest potential research leads. In this chapter, I will discuss some 
important topics that have not been addressed by the previous empirical chapters. Then 
I will review the recent literature on technological diversification and identify missing 
links (the mediation effect) that can explain how technological diversification can lead 
to firm performance. 
6.1 Contributions, limitations and implications  
Contributions 
 
This thesis makes several theoretical contributions to the literature. From the 
mechanical view, I provide a theoretical unpacking of the two dimensions of 
technological diversification and a more comprehensive operationalisation of both 
dimensions. While previous research mainly concentrates on the explorative dimension 
of technological diversification, this thesis argues that we should also pay attention to 
the exploitative dimension that emphasises how deeply firms understand in each of the 
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technology domains. The more comprehensive understandings of technological 
diversification will help us know better how technological diversification will confer 
firms with competitive advantages to profit. 
 
From an institutional view, this thesis argues that the institutions matter which is largely 
ignored in previous research. Previous research overlooks how firms’ strategies such as 
diversification can also be influenced by institutions. In this regard, firms are affected 
by a dominated institution and try to imitate others to get legitimacy. However, whether 
technological diversification affects firm performance through an institutional way is 
less understood. I provide a theoretical explanation that how firms use technological 
diversification as a way to get legitimated and use this legitimacy to profit. In this way, 
this thesis provides another explanation to the technological diversification-firm 
performance relationship. 
 
From the optimal distinctiveness view, if both the aforementioned views of 
technological diversification hold true, optimal distinctiveness view provides the 
combinations of both perspectives that offers a comprehensive view of how firms can 
profit for technological diversification consider both the environments and the 
individual firm. Previous studies mentioned less about the institutional explanations of 
technological diversification, even less when considered the balanced view. This view, 
however, can help understand not only why firms will engage diversification strategy 
but also what this strategy will be to make a better performance. 




Apart from the limitations that in the aforementioned empirical chapters, there are some 
limitations that I should emphasise to avoid overinterpret the findings. First, this thesis 
only considers one kind of diversification-technological diversification. However, I 
should admit that there are some other kinds of diversification such as product 
diversification, geographical diversification among others. Whether the findings hold 
true remain to be investigated in terms of other kinds of diversification. 
 
Second, with the available data, I cannot unpack diversification into related and 
unrelated diversification. As a result, the findings cannot distinguish whether firms 
expand their technology portfolios related to their core capabilities or whether they 
expand their technological boundaries randomly. This is because I cannot measure the 
related and unrelated diversification as the IPC data lack the detailed information to be 
further unpacked into four and two-digit classes.  
 
Third, the lack of consideration of another effect that may change the relationship 
between technological diversification and firm performance. In this thesis, I explored 
the boundary conditions (i.e. moderating effect) in terms of the external environments 
and the internal factors. However, recent studies (e.g. Li-Ying et al. (2016)) reminded 
us the mediation effect might also take place to affect the relationship. Though I do not 
empirically investigate the mediation effect, I will elaborate this effect and 
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methodology issues in next sections to encourage future research. 
Managerial implications 
 
Chapter 3 and 4 verifies the mechanical view and institutional view of technological 
diversification respectively. The chapter 5 goes further by combining both views. As a 
result, and at this point, I would strongly suggest managers should follow the findings 
from the optimal distinctiveness view. firms should be “different enough from peer 
firms to be competitive, but similar enough to peers to be recognizable” (Zhao and 
colleagues, 2017: 93). Firms should be aware that, despite the benefits of strategic 
conformity, reaching a high level of conformity beyond the optimal point does not 
necessarily contribute to firm performance and may even be detrimental to outcomes.  
 
As the findings suggest, diminishing returns are observed when firms’ technological 
diversification conformity increases past an optimal point. Managers should 
continuously monitor a firm’s technology patterns and performance. If unanticipated 
slowed growth or a decline in firm performance is observed, managers should try to 
counter any trend towards greater distinctiveness of the firm’s technology strategies. In 
terms of technological diversification, we suggest firms should first resort to a degree 
of technological diversification similarity compared with their peers to achieve 
legitimacy. This conformity is important, as it can demonstrate firms’ right to survive 
in the industry (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). They may imitate the most successful 
firms’ technological patterns in their industry to demonstrate there are the players on 
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the market (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). Then firms should decide an optimal level of 
differentiation (based on their organisational attributes such as firm age and state 
ownership) to outperform their competitors. In this way, firms can profit and be what 
Deephouse said “as different as legitimately possible” (Deephouse, 1999: 146).  
 
 
6.2 An integrated perspective on technological diversification 
I suggest that technological diversification can serve as the hardcore to meet the 
technological purpose of increasing efficiency, to mitigate the interdependence of 
external environments, and to lower the transaction costs from buying technologies. In 
addition, technological diversification can also serve as the softcore to meet the society 
and institutional purpose to maintain legitimacy and the right to survive. The optimal 
distinctiveness view, however, is a combination of the two. On the one hand, firms 
should be efficient in order to compete for limited resources in niches and gain a 
competitive advantage in that technology field. On the other hand, they should conform 
to industry norms and regulations to stay in a legitimate situation. To build an integrated 
framework, I will discuss some topics that have not been addressed in the previous 
empirical chapters. 
 
Although I have discussed the importance of legitimacy, in terms of the definitions and 
consequences, in previous chapters, an important question that has not been addressed 
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earlier is: where does legitimacy come from? In other words, what confers 
organisational legitimacy? 
 
In Deephouse et al. (2017) work, they refer to the entity that confers organisational 
legitimacy as the source that makes decisions that an organisation is legitimate or 
illegitimate. The first source of legitimacy is the state. For example, firms in China can 
be categorised generally into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. 
It has been found that the resources and market positions of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) are asymmetric in China. SOEs have 
been characterised as actors who “naturally have legitimacy and receive support or even 
protection from the government agencies that have founded them” (Li and Zhang, 2007: 
794). Also, some organisations are routinely evaluated by government agencies. For 
example, in China, banks need to be certificated by the state to get a licence. Thus, these 
agencies have the right to accredit legitimacy to financial organisations. 
 
Another source of legitimacy is public opinion. Public opinion can reflect the social 
norms and rules that accredit the organisation as being within the acceptable range. 
Bitektine and Haack (2015) give an interesting example of how public opinion can 
guide the purposes and targets of the Academy of Management Review. They suggest 
that the articles published in AMR are a reflection of the social norms and opinions 
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about which people are concerned. In this way, social opinion decides what it is right 
to publish. 
 
The market can also be a legitimacy source. In the perfect market where information is 
symmetric, firms may use their product and service to compete with their peers. As a 
result, firms which can provide better services to their customers may earn the 
reputations (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) and further get legitimated by 
market infrastructures such as customers watchdogs, rating agencies among others (Gao 
et al., 2017). For example, Phillips and Zuckerman (2001); Zuckerman (1999) proposed 
that analyst can categorise firms into different classes. While firms with a higher 
ranking are believed as legitimated, firms with middle-ranking have to conform to the 
rest of peers to get legitimate. They also suggested that firms with lowest rankings are 
supposed to be nonconformist as they are relatively stable in their positions regardless 
their actions.  
 
The media can also be a source of legitimacy (Deephouse, 2000). First, the media can 
be a way to convey social opinions to the public and decide the right form of 
organisational behaviour (Deeds, Mang, & Frandsen, 2004; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; 
Pollock & Rindova, 2003). An organisation can increase its survival rate by convincing 
the stakeholders that its competitors are not legitimate (Deephouse, 2000; Deephouse 
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& Carter, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Two research streams have emerged in 
media study. Some have argued that the media is a social conveyor to public opinion, 
and later research has also documented that the media can shape public opinion. This is 
especially the case with the advances in big data and fast and more reliable information 
channels being available.  
 
For example, the idea of the shared bike is spreading in China. At first, the shared bike 
was just a business innovation idea among small numbers of entrepreneurs and 
customers. However, the media has institutionalised the idea and followed the path of 
innovation, local validation, diffusion, and general validation (Johnson, Dowd, & 
Ridgeway, 2006). The innovative idea was first accepted by local customers, especially 
in some developed areas in China. Customers believe that they do not need to own a 
bike but rather can rent one instead as this can be more cost-efficient. At the start, the 
idea was validated locally. Then, the media helped to diffuse the new idea across the 
country. The national and local media advocated the benefits of shared bikes. Thus 
people nationwide came to accept the idea. At last, with more people accepting the idea, 
the shared bike became institutionalised and legitimated. In sum, the media can be a 
source of legitimacy.  
 
Moreover, individuals can also be a source of legitimacy. Although early on, Zucker 
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(1977) studied how individuals can confer legitimacy, most research has been 
conducted at the collective level to see how organisations can confer legitimacy to 
another organisation. However, recent theoretical advances have already considered 
individuals as a source of legitimacy. Tost (2011) argued that “that individual-level 
legitimacy judgments are based on evaluations that fall along three dimensions 
(instrumental, relational, and moral)” (pp 686). In her article, Tost proposed three stages 
of legitimacy judgement: judgement formation, judgement use and judgement 
reassessment. Judgement formation and judgement reassessment are two judgement 
stages and judgement use, in her words, is an additional stage in which the opinions of 
the judgement can be utilised by individuals to see the validity of the judgement. In the 
judgement formation stage, an initial opinion is given by an individual through an 
evaluation. At this stage, individuals can use social criteria to decide whether an action 
was legitimate or illegitimate. She also proposes two modes of judgement formation, 
the evaluation mode, which refers to judgments of the overall legitimacy of an entity, 
constructed on the basis of evaluations of the entity along the instrumental, relational, 
and/or moral dimensions, and the passive mode, which refers to individuals either using 
validity cues as cognitive shortcuts to reach a legitimacy judgment or passively 
assuming the legitimacy of entities that conform to cultural expectations (Tost, 2011: 
696). The use stage, on the other hand, carries the legitimacy judgement formed in the 
previous stage (legitimacy judgement). At this stage, individuals use the judgement to 
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guide an entity’s behaviours. Individuals support organisations that are characterised as 
legitimate and boycott whose images are illegitimate. In the last stage, the judgement 
assessment stage, the legitimacy of the entity is re-evaluated. At this stage, individuals 
can use the feedback from the judgement using the stage to reassess the legitimacy 
status of the entity. As a result, “in the reassessment stage the evaluative mode 
predominates, and individuals engage in active attempts to evaluate the entity along the 
dimensions of instrumental, relational, and/or moral legitimacy, which once again drive 
judgments of generalised legitimacy” (Tost, 2011: 699). 
 
Recently, Bitektine and Haack (2015) have refined the legitimacy model and proposed 
the micro and macro foundations of legitimacy. In terms of the micro-foundation, they 
specify that how individuals judge an entity can be a source of legitimacy. In their theory, 
they call the individuals who judge and confer legitimacy evaluators. Evaluators make 
their own decisions about the social acceptance of an organisation based on its social, 
political, and economic outcomes. Specifically, they argue that at an individual-level, 
legitimacy comes from propriety, which refers to an evaluator’s approval of the 
organisation, its actions, or its practices as desirable and appropriate (Bitektine & Haack, 
2015; Johnson et al., 2006). Propriety is thus an individual perception of social 
judgement and acceptance. They also propose validity at the collective level, which 
refers to “the extent to which there appears to be a general consensus within a 
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collectivity that the entity is appropriate for its social context” (Tost, 2011:689). 
Individual-level propriety can also form collective level validity, which can confer 
legitimacy. In conclusion, individuals can also confer legitimacy on organisations. 
6.3 Missing link between technological diversification and firm performance 
In previous chapters, I have discussed the moderating effect of the technological 
diversification- firm performance relationship. However, recent literature has also 
suggested that the link between firms’ strategies and firms’ performance is not a black 
box, but rather is mediated by the typical firm and environmental characteristics (Li-
Ying et al., 2016). In the following sections, I will propose and discuss two different 
levels (firm and region) of mediation factors that may facilitate or deter the link between 
technological diversification and firm performance (Sun, Hu, & Hillman, 2016).  
 
This mediation model draws on the theoretical advances that distinguish between firms’ 
resources and dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Previously, the 
dynamic capability view held that firms could continuously renew and reconfigure their 
resource base (Teece, 2007). In this regard, the dynamic can be understood as “change”, 
while the capability can be regarded as “process” (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Helfat 
& Peteraf, 2009). Many scholars have theoretically positioned firms’ capability as 
routines embedded in their daily work and tasks (Arend & Bromiley, 2009; Zollo & 
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Winter, 2002). In this regard, dynamic capabilities are routines to learn new routines 
(Adler et al., 1999; Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Schilke, 2014). Scholars have 
identified several micro-foundations of dynamic capabilities, such as research and 
design (R&D) (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), regional foreign direct investment (Ning, 
Wang, & Li, 2016), and institutional infrastructure (Gao et al., 2017). 
 
Dynamic capability, in a nutshell, can sense, seize and reconfigure firms’ capacities 
(Teece, 2007). Sensing indicates firms’ capability to identify opportunities, seizing is 
the capability to utilise and invest in those opportunities, and reconfiguring is the 
capability to integrate firms’ resources to implement those tasks. 
 
While early literature documented that dynamic capability referred to a firm's resources 
and made no distinction between firms’ resources and firms’ dynamic capability, recent 
studies suggest that the RBV and the dynamic capability view should be understood as 
complementary concepts (Sirmon & Hitt, 2009). They are neither monolithic constructs 
nor two separate and orthogonal concepts. Instead, they are intertwined to influence 
firm performance (Helfat, 1997; Helfat & Peteraf, 2009). Helfat and Peteraf (2009) 
proposed a framework, which is illustrated in Figure 6-1, that best describes the 
rationale behind my following sections. 
 






Figure 6- 1 Basic logic between resource and dynamic capability; Adapted from Helfat and Peteraf (2009) 
and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) 
 
 
Since legitimacy can also be understood as a resource that can be acquired and 
manipulated by organisations, the mechanical view and the institutional view can thus 
also be integrated into the consideration of firms’ resources (Dacin et al., 2002; Kostova 
et al., 2008; Oliver, 1991, 1997). Thus, a missing link, following Figure 6-1, is the 
configuration of dynamic capabilities that connect the firms’ resources to its 
performance. Firms’ resources are expected to translate into a competitive advantage 
through dynamic capabilities, and dynamic capabilities rest on firms’ processes, which 
can alter its current position to generate returns (Li-Ying et al., 2016). 
 
Based on the resource-based view and dynamic capability view, I argue that firms’ 
dynamic capabilities can mediate firms’ resources such as technological diversification. 
Besides the moderating effect discussed earlier, I, therefore, propose a mediation model 
that may further encourage technological diversification in the future. I will explain 
some key concepts and the recent advances in mediation testing to further elaborate the 
mediation model. First, from the mechanical view, technological diversification is a 
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firm resource. Apart from understanding the RBV, technological diversification can 
also be regarded as a means to reduce environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Xia et al., 2014) and to reduce the transaction costs from buying technologies 
from the market (Leten et al., 2007; Miller, 2006). Thus, technological diversification, 
from the mechanical view, can be taken as a firm resource that is used to build 
competitive advantage. 
 
Apart from the mechanical view, technological diversification can be regarded as an 
incentive to acquire organisational legitimacy. In this view, legitimacy can also be 
understood as an asset to the firm and a resource that can be accessed. As illustrated 
earlier, the state, the media, public opinion and individuals can be sources of 
organisational legitimacy. Firms thus can leverage different strategies to affect these 
entities and get access to legitimacy (Oliver, 1997). For example, firms can gain 
legitimacy by lobbying government officials and thus influencing policy makings 
(Dacin et al., 2002; Stevens, Xie, & Peng, 2016). In this regard, from an institutional 
view, technological diversification can also be regarded as a firm resource that can be 
used to access legitimacy. 
Firm-level mediation effect 
Technological diversification is a firm choice whereby the firm exploratively and 
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exploitatively cultivates multiple technologies (Garcia-Vega, 2006; Suzuki & Kodama, 
2004). In order to achieve economies of scope, firms should build internal competence 
(Laursen & Salter, 2006) such as in-house R&D to explore the benefits of technological 
diversification. 
 
In-house R&D is a prerequisite for firms to build absorptive capability (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). R&D also represents the typical type of dynamic capability, whereby 
firms recombine and reconfigure their resources to learn new routines (Lane & Lubatkin, 
1998). In-house R&D can help firms to reduce their learning costs in terms of time and 
efficiency (Fleming, 2001). In-house R&D can also help enhance firms’ internal to-do 
capabilities to capture the value of their existing resources (Chandrashekhar, 2006). 
This is especially important for deepening our understanding of multiple technologies, 
which is referred to as exploitative technological diversification. As I discussed in 
Chapter 2, exploitative technological diversification has often been neglected in the 
previous research. However, firms can also refine and deepen their knowledge of 
multiple technologies, thus meaning that technological diversification can be regarded 
as exploitation. This exploitation needs in-house R&D to build internal know-how to 
realise the potential (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008). 
 
Moreover, in-house R&D investment can improve a firm’s ability to absorb, assimilate, 
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and extend its ability to search for external technologies (Leal-Rodríguez, Ariza-Montes, 
Roldán, & Leal-Millán, 2014). This is especially important for explorative 
technological diversification, which refers to expanding technologies beyond firms’ 
current technological portfolios. When firms try to expand their technology portfolios, 
they must either purchase from the market or develop capabilities within the firm 
boundaries. As exploitative technological diversification is related to developing 
technological capability within firms, R&D can also help firms to acquire technologies 
from the market. First, R&D as an absorptive capability can help firms explore potential 
technologies at the market. Second, R&D can also help firms to assimilate those 
technologies bought from the market and build technological capabilities in the 
expanded fields. In sum, R&D can also help firms to undertake exploitative 
technological diversification.  
 
Apart from those benefits, as a potential absorptive capability, R&D can also help firms 
to realise its performance benefits. As Zahra and George (2002) indicated, there are two 
types of absorptive capability, which are referred to as potential absorptive capability 
and realised absorptive capability. Their proposition can be found in Figure 6-2. 
 
Resource and complementary experience Realized absorptive capabilityPotential absorptive capability Competitive advantage
 
Figure 6- 2Absorptive capability framework, adapted from Zahra and George (2002) 
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As depicted in Figure 6-2, the resources should link to competitive advantage via 
potential and realised absorptive capability. As R&D is a type of potential absorptive 
capability, it can help technological diversification link to competitive advantage. Thus: 
 
Proposition 6-1: A firm’s in-house R&D investment mediates the relationship between 
technological diversification and the firm’s technological innovation performance. 
Regional level mediation effect 
Apart from the firm level mediator, I also argue that there are some regional level factors 
that can link technological diversification to firm performance. As Zahra and George 
(2002) indicate, the absorptive capability can be distinguished as potential and realised 
absorptive capability. As I regard in-house R&D as potential absorptive capability, I 
consider technology market turnover as the regional mediator that can possibly link 
technological diversification to firm performance. Technology market transaction 
turnover is a regional realised absorptive capability. Technology market transaction 
turnover refers to the total amount of sales in the technology market. This factor reflects 
the regional marketability, which can translate technologies into profits (Wang, Pan, 
Ning, Li, & Chen, 2015). As innovation can be referred to, on the one hand, as new 
ideas and production, and on the other hand, as the commercialisation of these ideas 
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and products (Chesbrough, 2003), the technology market transaction turnover can 
indicate the regional ability to translate innovative ideas into the markets. 
 
In the context of technological diversification, whether or not technological 
diversification will profit relies heavily on its regional ability to translate the 
technologies into products. Zahra and George (2002) refer to realised absorptive 
capability as the efficiency factor and state that realised absorptive capability could 
approach the outputs of potential absorptive capability. In this sense, in-house R&D can 
help firms to become versatile in multiple technologies, both exploratively and 
exploitatively; the regional technology market transaction is the regional capability that 
realises the multiple capabilities within firms. In this sense, I argue that as a realised 
absorptive capability, technology market transaction turnover also can mediate the 
relationship between technological diversification and firm performance. Hence: 
 
Proposition 6-2 Regional market transaction turnover mediates the relationship 
between technological diversification and the firm’s technological innovation 
performance. 
 
Besides regional realised absorptive capacity, there are also some factors that can be 
regarded as potential absorptive capability at the regional level. I argue that regional 
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FDI can be regarded as a potential absorptive capability. FDI has been recognised as a 
key external source of newly created and advanced knowledge, allowing international 
technology transfers to take place from developed countries to host regions. Many 
advanced technologies are transferred to under-developed regions. As a result, firms in 
these under-developed regions benefit from interacting with foreign firms and exchange 
information with these partners (Fu, 2008; Fu & Gong, 2011). Therefore, firms in 
emerging countries such as China are building their technology capabilities and 
catching up with their Western counterparts through learning from multi-national 
enterprises (MNEs) (Crespo & Fontoura, 2007; Ning, 2009; Ning et al., 2016). Regions 
in China are the main recipients of FDI activities, and thus they provide an ideal 
background for a local firm to absorb advanced technologies. 
 
A typical effect of FDI is spillover. FDI spillover is geographically bounded when local 
firms co-locate and closely interact with MNEs within a specific region (Cheung & Lin, 
2004; Wei & Liu, 2006). FDI spillover can contribute to local technology upgrading 
and enhance regional absorptive capability (Görg & Greenaway, 2004; Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). In this sense, local firms will increase their know-how ability 
when they interact with MNEs. When foreign firms expand into regions, foreign 
investors often exploit and demonstrate their advanced technology in their subsidiaries. 
They do this for two main reasons. First, local governments may provide benefits and 
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policies if they can transfer their advanced technologies to their local subsidiaries. 
Second, in order to gain local legitimacy, they need to demonstrate their ability to 
benefit the local community with their superior technologies (Stevens & Newenham-
Kahindi, 2017; Stevens et al., 2016). 
 
In the context of technological diversification, I argue that regional FDI can serve as an 
important potential absorptive capability that helps firms to expand their technology 
portfolios. Regional FDI, on the one hand, can bring unfamiliar technologies to local 
firms to help them expand their technical fields, thus increasing the explorative 
technological diversification. On the other hand, local firms can deepen their 
understanding of multiple technologies while interacting with MNEs. They can get a 
better understanding of how to allocate human capital in technologies, and how to 
manage resources within and between firms when they are doing business with MNEs. 
Thus, regional FDI can serve as a potential absorptive capability to mediate the 
relationship between technological diversification and firm performance. Hence: 
 
Proposition 6-3 Regional FDI mediates the relationship between technological 
diversification and a firm’s technological innovation performance. 
 
In summary, in Figure 6-3, I propose a technological diversification research model 
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based on the previous chapters and aforementioned discussions.  
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Figure 6- 3Technological diversification research framework
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6.4 Methodologies of the mediation effect 
The structural equation model (SEM) has been adopted widely and extensively to test 
the mediation effect in the psychology, marketing and communication literature, among 
others (Barrett, 2007; Byrne, 2001; Ko & Stewart, 2002; Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, 
& King, 2006). One explanation for this may be the nature of the data used in these 
streams of study. In marketing and psychological studies, questionnaire and survey data 
are often used to test the hypotheses. These data, in nature, are cross-sectional and can 
hardly be expanded to panel data models. Thus, scholars resort to the model proposed 
by Baron and Kenny (1986) when studying panel data mediation effects (e.g. Gielnik, 
Spitzmuller, Schmitt, Klemann, and Frese (2015); Li-Ying et al. (2016); Rodríguez and 
Nieto (2016). However, recent methodological advances have demonstrated that the 
model is redundant and may fail to support what it claims (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). 
 





















Figure 6- 4Mediation effect model 
 
As suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986, 1176), three tests should be made to verify 
the hypothesised mediation effect: 
 
A variable functions as a mediator when it meets the following conditions: (a) 
variations in levels of the independent variable significantly account for variations in 
the presumed mediator (i.e., Path a), (b) variations in the mediator significantly 
account for variations in the dependent variable (i.e., Path b), and (c) when Paths a 
and b are controlled, a previously significant relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables is no longer significant, with the strongest demonstration of 
mediation occurring when Path c is zero. 
 
In other words, their independent regressions should be tested: 
 







                      (eqution 6-1)
                      (eqution 6-2)
              (eqution 6-3)
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Then these authors argue that to test mediation, one should estimate the three following 
regression equations: first, regressing the mediator on the independent variable; second, 
regressing the dependent variable on the independent variable; and third, regressing the 
dependent variable on both the independent variable and the mediator. To establish 
mediation, the following conditions must hold: First, the independent variable must 
affect the mediator in the first equation; second, the independent variable must be 
shown to affect the dependent variable in the second equation; and third, the mediator 
must affect the dependent variable in the third equation (1986,1177). 
 
Furthermore, Baron and Kenny also suggest a Sobel test that can investigate the 
significance of the indirect path a b  
 
 








                                   (equation 6-4) 
 
Where a and b are the coefficients of paths a and b respectively, and sa and sb are the 
standard errors of a and b from equations 1 and 3 respectively. 
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However, the Sobel test is ineffective and may too constrain to indicate a mediation 
effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Zhao et al. (2010) proposed that the only criterion that 
establishes a mediation effect is that a b  should be significant. The Sobel test is low 
in power compared with the bootstrapped resampling method proposed by Preacher and 
Hayes (2004). In conclusion, the regression of equation 6-2 is redundant, and the Sobel 
test should be implemented through high power bootstrapped sampling.  
 
Preacher and Hayes (2004) proposed a SAS program and SPSS macro to implement the 
bootstrapped Sobel test. Their implementation is cross-sectional in nature; however, it 
can be easily expanded into panel data models. I strongly suggest that future research 















Table A. IPC classification used in this thesis 
Classification  Name 
A  Human necessities 
B  Performing operations; 
Transporting 
C  Chemistry; Metallurgy 
D  Textiles; Paper 
E  Fixed constructions 
F  Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; 
Heating; Weapons; Blasting 
G  Physics 
H  Electricity 
 
Table B. Variable definition in chapter 3 
 
Variables Equation Definition 





MV= (Total shares -B Share) ×Closing 
price of A share + B Share × Closing 
price ×Exchange Rate. 







Explorative technological diversification 
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Firms operate in raw chemical materials 
and chemical products (C43); chemical 
fibres (C47); electronics (C5); 
instruments, meters, cultural, and clerical 
machinery (C78); pharmaceuticals (C8); 
and information technology (G) will be 







=   
Intangible assets include patent, non-
patent technology, trademark, copyright, 
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ary assets land use right, etc 
VAD ratio is calculated by dividing the 
value added by the sales of the firm. 
Where the value added is calculated as 
the sum of the profit, wage expenses, 





the fraction of the overall number of 
directors 
Board size  
number of board members to measure 
this variable 
Firm age  
deducting the current observation year 
from the year in which the firm was first 
listed on the stock market 
Firm size  natural log of the total assets 
Leverage  total debt divided by the total assets 
EM  
Firm profit, regression slope (β), divide 
by mean (Y ) 
ED  
Firm profit, standard error ( bS ), divide 
by mean (Y ) 
 
 
Table C. Variable definition in chapter 4 
 
 
Variables Equation Definition 





MV= (Total shares -B 
Share) ×Closing price of A 
share + B Share × Closing 
price ×Exchange Rate. 
TA is the total assets 
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technological space of the 
thi  firm, and ijN  is the 
number of patents that the 
thi   firm holds in the 
technological category j ( (1,2, ,8)j = . 





the fraction of the overall 
number of directors 
Board size  
number of board members 
to measure this variable 
Firm age  
deducting the current 
observation year from the 
year in which the firm was 
first listed on the stock 
market 
Firm size  
natural log of the total 
assets 
Leverage  
total debt divided by the 
total assets 
EM  
Firm profit, regression 
slope (β), divide by mean 
(Y ) 
ED  
Firm profit, standard error 
( bS ), divide by mean (Y ) 
 
  
Table D. Variable definition in chapter 5 
 
Variables Equation Definition 





MV= (Total shares -B 
Share) ×Closing price of A 
share + B Share × Closing 
price ×Exchange Rate. 
TA is the total assets 
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industry average and the 





the fraction of the overall 
number of directors 
Board size  
number of board members 
to measure this variable 
Firm age  
deducting the current 
observation year from the 
year in which the firm was 
first listed on the stock 
market 
Firm size  
natural log of the total 
assets 
Leverage  





1 if the firms controlled by 
the state and related 
agencies, 0 otherwise 
EM  
Firm profit, regression 
slope (β), divide by mean 
(Y ) 
ED  
Firm profit, standard error 
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